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Using Judgments as Evidence
Hiroshi Motomura*
INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion"
states that the parties to a lawsuit, and those in privity with
them, are bound by any decision of fact or law fully and fairly
litigated on a previous occasion and necessary to the court's
judgment.' No one who contests an issue and loses can relitigate it in a later suit, whether on the same or a different claim.
In most cases, collateral estoppel operates in conjunction with
the rule against hearsayto produce a fundamental but rarely
examined result: when a court assesses a prior judgment's 2 effect on subsequent litigation, only two outcomes are possible.
Either the prior finding is binding in the later proceeding, or it
is inadmissible hearsay and has no effect at all. This all-ornothing approach implicitly rejects a third possibility-admitting the prior judgment as evidence of the matters found,3 but
Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
My faculty colleagues, in, particular Cliff Calhoun, Emily Calhoun, Rick
Collins, Howard Klemme, Mark Loewenstein, Dan Magraw, Court Peterson,
Peter Simon, Mike Waggoner, Mimi Wesson, and Steve Williams, made many
helpful suggestions and comments. Erich Bethke, Carol Haller, Christy Klein,
Peter Ludwig, Laurie Paddock, and Joni Teter provided valuable counsel and
excellent research assistance. Everyone mentioned and many others deserve
thanks for their encouragement and support.
1. Collateral estoppel or "issue preclusion" should be distinguished from
merger and bar or "claim preclusion," which states that a final judgment on
the merits bars further suit by parties or their privies on the same claim.
Although treatment in the literature varies, this article uses the term "res
judicata" to encompass both collateral estoppel and merger and bar, rather
than just collateral estoppel. On terminology, see Migra v. Warren City School
Dist. Bd.of Educ., 104 S.Ct. 892, 894 n.1 (1984); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402 (1981 & Supp. 1985);
Casad, Two Imlportant Books on Res Judicata (Book Review), 80 MICH. L.
REV. 664, 675 (1982).
2. This Article uses the word "judgment" broadly, to include any assertion that results from deliberation and is intended to be final as far as that tribunal is concerned. The words "judgment" and "finding" are essentially
interchangeable for the purposes of this Article.
3. Cf Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1385-86 (11th Cir. 1982) (prior
judgment establishes defendants were on notice of matters found), cert. de*
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without giving it binding effect.
Technically speaking, of course, a prior judgment is hearsay.4 Most commentators realize, however, that the real issue is
not whether a prior judgment is hearsay, but whether an exception to the rule against hearsay should be created allowing a
prior judgment to be admissible as evidence. 5 Over 150 years
ago, Jeremy Bentham proposed the use of judgments as evidence as an alternative to collateral estoppel.6 More recently,
Dean John Wigmore observed that "there are numerous situations in which it seems unreasonable and impractical to ignore
the evidential use of a judgment in another proceeding involving the same fact as in the present case." 7
Many have suggested evidentiary use of judgments,8 but no
nied, 464 U.S. 932 (1983); Indiana State Highway Comm'n v. Rickert,
App.

-,

-

425 N.E.2d 620, 622-23 (1981) ("A judgment is always evidence ...

Ind.
of

the fact that such a judgment has been given and entered and of the legal consequences which result from the fact of that judgment.").
4. The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or the hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID.
801(c). "Analytically, [a prior judgment] is hearsay, since it is based on the
opinion of twelve persons who have not been cross-examined and have no personal knowledge of the underlying facts .... " 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
803(22)[01], at 803-350 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
Rule 802 generally prohibits the admission of hearsay evidence. See FED. R.
EVID. 802. Rules 803 and 804 enumerate exceptions to this prohibition. See
FED. R. Evm. 803, 804.
5. See E. CLEARY, McCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 318, at 893-94 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]; 4 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 4, 803(22)[01], at 803-350; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 1671a, at 807-08 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1974); Note,
Judgments as Evidence, 46 IOWA L. REv. 400, 402 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Judgments].
6. Bentham, The Rationaleof JudicialEvidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 171 (Bowring ed. 1843) ("[Tlhat, however, because [a judgment]
ought not to be made conclusive, it ought not to be admissible, is an inference
which none but a lawyer would ever think of drawing.").
7. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1671a, at 807.
8. Berch, A Proposalto Permit CollateralEstoppel of NonpartiesSeeking
Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 511, 532 n.103; Currie, Mutuality of
Collateral EstoppeL Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281,
320-21 (1957); Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppe: Limiting the
PreclusiveEffect of Administrative Determinations in JudicialProceedings,
35 U. FLA. L. REv. 422, 460-62 (1983); Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of CollateralEstoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1010, 1053 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, Defensive and Offensive Assertion].
Others have discussed the use of prior criminal judgments as evidence.
See Cowen, The Admissibility of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civil
Proceedings,40 CALIF. L. REV. 225 (1952); Palmer, The Admissibility of Judg-
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one has analyzed it in any detail. Courts rarely discuss the
practice, perhaps because they assume that it is generally prohibited. As a leading commentary states: "Although older
cases reflect occasional efforts to use prior findings simply as
evidence, it has long been settled that preclusion ordinarily is
an all or nothing thing."9
This neglect is regrettable. An all-or-nothing orientation
toward the use of prior judgments reflects hidden but pivotal
assumptions about our system of procedure. These assumptions
concern not only the appropriate scope and purpose of collateral estoppel and evidence, but also the nature and limits of adjudication. This Article examines these assumptions as well as
the more specific question whether prior judgments should be
admissible into evidence in subsequent civil litigation.10
Part I examines several of the scattered categories of prior
judgments that courts have admitted into evidence and develops a hypothesis to explain why courts have done so. Part II
explores the similarities and differences between using judgments as evidence and collateral estoppel and suggests reasons
for preferring one or the other. Part III discusses the significant difference under current doctrine, which is that a prior
proceeding can be admitted into evidence against a nonparty to
the original suit, but generally may not be used to collaterally
estop a nonparty. Part IV discusses how this difference may be
eroding under growing pressure to expand collateral estoppel
to permit preclusion of nonparties and suggests that admitting
prior judgments into evidence is a better alternative. Part V
considers whether it is practical and wise to allow judges and
juries to evaluate prior findings as evidence and determines,
with some hesitation, that it is. Part VI concludes with a proposal that, as a general rule, prior judicial findings that would be
ments in Subsequent Proceedings, 3 N.Z.U.L. REV. 142, 142-68 (1968); Note,
Judgments, supra note 5, at 401-11; Note, Admissibility and Weight of a
Criminal Conviction in a Subsequent Civil Action, 39 VA. L. REV. 995 (1953).
Several others have recognized that the subject might lend itself to comparative study. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 421-24 (4th ed. 1980);
Cowen, supra, at 242-48 (contrasting the treatment of the issue by the Canadian, South African, and Australian legal systems); Palmer, supra (discussing

the laws of the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand).
9. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 144
(footnotes omitted); accord MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 318, at 894; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1671a, at 806-07.
10. This Article does not discuss later criminal proceedings because they
raise some unique problems, particularly those under the confrontation clause
of the sixth amendment.
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collateral estoppel against a party should be admitted into evidence against a nonparty.
I.

ADMISSIBLE PRIOR JUDGMENTS

There are several categories of judgments that are routinely admitted into evidence despite the general rule that prior
judgments are inadmissible hearsay. Examples include administrative findings, criminal convictions, antitrust judgments,
state employment discrimination findings, and judgments of
patent validity. Although there is no apparent common theme
that explains why judgments in these categories are admissible
and other judgments are not, a closer analysis reveals that this
odd array is attributable to the historical development of the
law of collateral estoppel. Findings in these categories were initially allowed into evidence because collateral estoppel was, for
various reasons, unavailable, and courts wanted to give the
prior judgment at least some effect in subsequent litigation.
Later, as courts adopted a more expansive interpretation of collateral estoppel, judgments in four of these categories were accorded collateral estoppel effect.11 By that time, admission as
evidence was firmly entrenched, giving rise to a continuum of
effect for prior judgments in these particular categories. A
prior finding could be binding as collateral estoppel or be admissible as evidence. A closer look at these five categories of
admissible judgments illustrates this point.
A.

ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS

Most courts originally accepted the view that administrative findings were ineligible for either collateral estoppel or
merger and bar.'2 Since administrative findings were ineligible
for collateral estoppel, courts began admitting them into evidence-otherwise the findings would have no effect at all on
the subsequent litigation. The common law permitted a form
of this practice, 13 and modern evidence rules usually do so
11. Judgments of patent validity are still not given collateral estoppel effect. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
12. See United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 230-37 (1927);
Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1906).
13. Some early cases foreshadowed the Federal Rules approach. See, e.g.,

Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467, 472-73 (3d Cir. 1950)
(holding admissible report prepared by the Department of Mines). Other preRules cases were more restrictive in certain respects, leading one court to call
the federal rule "a major change from common law principles." Zenith Radio

Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
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through a hearsay exception such as Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 14 Admission of administrative findings
into evidence is now a frequent occurrence, provided the essential elements of the rule are satisfied.15
qffd

in part and rev'd in partsub non. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). See generally
FED. R. EviD. 803(8) advisory committee note (noting existence of public
records hearsay exemption at common law); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 4, %803(8)[01], at 803-233 to -236 (same).
14. Rule 803(8) provides a hearsay exception for:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth... (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8). The rule is premised on "the assumption that a public
official will perform his duty properly and the likelihood that he will remember details independently of the record." FED. R. EviD. 803(8)(C) advisory
committee note (citing Wong Wing Foo v. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120 (9th Cir.
1952)); see also Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th
Cir. 1983).
15. Rule 803(8)(C)'s basic requirements are discussed in Fraley v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1266-67 (S.D. Ohio 1979); 4 D. LouiSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §§ 455-456 (1980). Rule 803(8)(C) applies only to "civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in
criminal cases." FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C). The hearsay in the administrative
finding must be a "factual finding," the finding must have resulted from an
investigation authorized by law, and the hearsay statement must not be untrustworthy. Id.
Courts have construed the elements of the rule broadly to admit a broad
range of administrative findings from agency hearings, reports, and studies.
See, e.g., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 556-57 (6th Cif. 1978) (police accident report), cert denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); Revlon, Inc. v. Carson
Prods. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (affidavit of FDA official);
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 358-60 (D.D.C.
1980) (factual findings resulting from FCC investigation). For example, courts
have interpreted the phrase "factual findings" to include evaluative reports.
See Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983);
Baker, 588 F.2d at 556-57; United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, Mich., 577
F.2d 1339, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1978); Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d
762, 769 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977); Hobson v. Wilson, 556 F.
Supp. 1157, 1181 (D.D.C. 1982), affd in relevant part and rev'd in part on
other grounds, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1843 (1985);
Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D. Nev. 1982). But see Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1980) (excluding
FDA changes in terminology of drug labels as resting on medical opinion not
medical fact).
With similar generosity, courts generally hold that an investigation "authorized by law" need not be required by law, only permitted. See, e.g., Fraley
v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1265, 1266 (S.D. Ohio 1979). Furthermore,
the rule does not require that the agency official act on personal firsthand
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In 1966, the United States Supreme Court expanded the
scope of collateral estoppel to include many types of administrative findings.16 In United States v. Utah Construction &
Mining Co.,17 the Court held that administrative findings are
collateral estoppel "[w]hen an administrative agency is acting in
a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly
before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to
8
litigate.'
knowledge. Rather, he or she may act on the basis of someone else's firsthand
or otherwise trustworthy knowledge. Robbins v. Whelan, 653 F.2d 47, 52 (1st
Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981); Fraley,470 F. Supp. at 1267; cf. United
States v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 747 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1984) (firsthand
knowledge must be that of a public official, his agent, or someone with a duty
to report matter to a public official).
Courts also have read the requirement of "trustworthiness" broadly, relying heavily on the Advisory Committee's four suggested criteria of timeliness
of the investigation, skill of the official, whether a hearing was conducted, and
possible motivational problems. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745
F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984); Wilson v. Beebe, 743 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1984),
vacated, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985); Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 22223 (5th Cir. 1980); Baker, 588 F.2d at 558; Walker, 554 F. Supp. at 653-54; In re
Multi-Piece Rims Prod. Liab. Litig., 545 F. Supp. 149, 151 (W.D. Mo. 1982);
Fraley, 470 F. Supp. at 1267. See generally Note, The Trustworthinessof Government Evaluative Reports Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), 96
HARV. L. REV. 492, 501-03, 505-09 (1982) (arguing that the four factors should
be interpreted as emphasizing the reliability of the report rather than as a list
of procedural safeguards) [hereinafter cited as Note, Trustworthiness].
16. A key transitional case in this movement was Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940), but Sunshine was unclear at the time
because it seemed to apply administrative res judicata without necessarily endorsing administrative collateral estoppel. Id at 401-04. See Perschbacher,
supra note 8, at 432.
17. 384 U.S. 394 (1966). Utah Construction contracted with the federal
government to build a facility for the Atomic Energy Commission. After completing the project, it relied on several contract clauses in filing claims for additional compensation and time extensions. After hearings, the Advisory
Board of Contract Appeals, to which the contract referred such disputes,
awarded Utah Construction partial relief. Id at 400. Dissatisfied, Utah Construction sued the government in the Court of Claims for breach of contract,
asserting that the government had caused unreasonable delay. Id at 401. The
Court of Claims ordered a trial de novo on the factual issues in the suit. I&
On review, the United States Supreme Court held unanimously that the
Board's prior findings were binding in the Court of Claims litigation, relying
on the dispute resolution clauses in the contract and on "general principles of
collateral estoppel." Id. at 421.
18. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 422; accord Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co.,
456 U.S. 461, 484 n.26 (1982). Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides for administrative collateral estoppel "only insofar as the proceeding resulting in the determination entailed the essential elements of
adjudication." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(2) (1982). Those
"essential elements" include notice, the right to present and rebut evidence
and argument, application of rules to specific transactions, a rule of finality,
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Under the Utah Construction approach, agency procedure
is a critical factor in determining the binding effect of an administrative finding. Formal proceedings, with procedures typical of courts, make collateral estoppel both appropriate and
likely.19 Collateral estoppel is more appropriate when an
agency applies special expertise 20 and less appropriate when it
acts outside its expertise. 2 1 Likewise, an agency's legislative
and policy-making authority,22 or other sources of potential
bias,23 may skew its decision making and make collateral estopand "[s]uch other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the
proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in question." Id. § 83(2)(a)-(e); accord CIBA Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640, 644
(1973); United Farm Workers v. Arizona Agricultural Employment Relations
Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982). In addition, of course, it also must
meet the collateral estoppel requirements that would apply to judicial findings. Anthan v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 672 F.2d 706, 709-10
(8th Cir. 1982); Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801, 805-06 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United
States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, Mich., 577 F.2d 1339, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1978);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 83(1) (1982).
These requirements may be more difficult to meet in the administrative
context, which, for example, may make it difficult to find identity of issues.
See Metropolitan Detroit Bricklayers Dist. Council v. J.E. Hoetger & Co., 672
F.2d 580, 583-84 (6th Cir. 1982); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Federal Energy Admin., 556 F.2d 542, 550-51 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
Collateral estoppel also may be an inappropriate extension of agency authority. See Wickham Contracting Co. v. Board of Educ. of New York, 715
F.2d 21, 28 (2d Cir. 1983); Lightsey v. Harding, Dahm & Co., 623 F.2d 1219,
1221-23 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
Also, an administrative determination may not be unambiguously "final."
See Texasgulf, Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 610 F. Supp. 1329, 1353
(D.D.C.), claim dismissed, 617 F. Supp. 41 (D.D.C. 1985); Donovan v. Diplomat
Envelope Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1417, 1422 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd mem., 760 F.2d
253 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Note, The CollateralEstoppel Effect ofAdministrative Agency Actions in FederalCivil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 65, 7085 (1977).
19. See Student Pub. Interest Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & 01cott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131, 1138-39 (3d Cir. 1985) (opportunity to intervene, hearing); United States v. Karlen, 645 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1981) (ability to
subpoena witnesses); Boykins v. Ambridge Area School Dist., 621 F.2d 75, 79
(3d Cir. 1980) (discovery rules); Nasem v. Brown, 595 F.2d 801, 805-06 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (ability to present testimony); Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v.
Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1969) (crossexamination).
20. For example, courts have noted that the National Labor Relations
Board applies its special competence in its hearings. See NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691 (1951).
21. See City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 734 F.2d
1157, 1166 (6th Cir.), cert- denied, 105 S. Ct. 253 (1984).
22. See Perschbacher, supra note 8, at 454.
23. See, e.g., Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 518 F. Supp. 1387, 1390-91
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (presence of interested parties on consulting staff rendered report untrustworthy).
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pel inappropriate. The scope of judicial review, or the lack
thereof, can have a similar effect.2 Finally, some agency proceedings are not sufficiently adjudicative, even if formal, to be
collateral estoppel. Thus, several courts have held that an "adjudication" may be used as collateral estoppel, but that a
"rulemaking" proceeding may not.2
The net result is that after Utah Construction,administrative findings can affect subsequent litigation in two different
ways. If they are not given preclusive effect through the application of collateral estoppel, they can still be given evidentiary
effect as an exception to the rule against hearsay. 26 This continuum of effect, and the choice that it gives courts, has a
certain appeal to common sense. But it effectively gives administrative findings greater influence on later litigation than other
types of findings exercise. Administrative findings that do not
qualify for collateral estoppel may be admitted into evidence.
Judicial findings, on the other hand, are not admissible under
Rule 803(8)(C),27 so a judicial finding that is not collateral es24. See McCulty v. Rockefeller, 570 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (S.D. W. Va. 1983);
Snow v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 543 F. Supp. 752, 756 (D. Nev. 1982); Zaika v.
Del E. Webb Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (D. Nev. 1981).
25. "[R]ulemaking bodies do not generally make the kind of discrete factual findings of past conduct that the adjudicative process is specifically
designed to provide." International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 444 F. Supp. 1148, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Second Taxing Dist. of
Newark v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 683 F.2d 477, 484 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (collateral estoppel does not apply to reconsideration of policy judgments
in quasi-legislative proceedings); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
498 F. Supp. 353, 360-63 (D.D.C. 1980) (court must carefully scrutinize findings
to differentiate policy-oriented conclusions and factual findings and conclusions).
26. For example, one district court recently held that certain Federal
Communications Commission findings were not collateral estoppel in related
antitrust litigation. It noted, however, that its holding "does not appear to
render the FCC's conclusions and recommendations completely meaningless"
because they might be admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. International Tel. & Tel. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 444 F.
Supp. 1148, 1160 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The court, however, declined to express
a view on admissibility. See also United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale,
Mich., 577 F.2d 1339, 1349-50, 1354-55 (6th Cir. 1978) (no collateral estoppel but
admissible under Rule 803(8)(C)); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
498 F. Supp. 353, 365 n.40 (D.D.C. 1980) (lack of collateral estoppel effect does
not bar use as evidence).
27. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125,
1185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 123 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor,. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1348 (1986). First, the court noted, neither the language nor legislative history
of Rule 803(8)(C) supports application to judicial findings. Id. at 1185. Second,
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toppel is ignored completely. Neither case law nor commentary
adequately explains why administrative28 findings should enjoy
this greater range of subsequent effect.

B. CRIMNAL CONVICTIONS
Earlier in this century, criminal convictions were ineligible
for collateral estoppel because they lacked mutuality. The prevailing view at that time was that no one should benefit from a
prior proceeding who could not be bound by it. Parties could
claim collateral estoppel, but nonparties could not because they
generally could not be bound by the prior judgment. Private
litigants could not use criminal convictions as collateral estoppel because the government, not the private parties, had prosecuted. 29 Since convictions could not be collateral estoppel in
the "trustworthiness" criterion is "totally unsuited to evaluating judicial findings." I& Third, where the drafters of the Rules "wished to make judicially
found facts admissible, they did so expressly." Id. And finally, judicial findings "would likely be given undue weight by the jury, thus creating a serious
danger of unfair prejudice." Id. at 1186. Part V discusses this last point by analyzing how decisionmakers in later litigation can properly evaluate prior findings. See infra text accompanying notes 296-327.
28. One might argue that administrative findings deserve more weight
than judicial findings because they reflect agency expertise that a judicial determination does not, or because agency procedures might generate a more
comprehensive paper record that is easier to evaluate. These arguments, however, are based on shaky factual assumptions. And if Rule 803(8)(C) is largely
based on the belief that public officials perform their official tasks carefully
and without bias or corruption, that rationale applies to judges at least as well
as to agency officials.
In fact, most administrative findings inspire less, perhaps much less, confidence than judicial findings. Rule 803(8)(C) admits agency determinations
that barely constitute official investigative activity. It admits other determinations, such as accident investigation reports, that are thorough but do not entail procedures normally associated with adjudication. See, e.g., Walker v.
Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D. Nev. 1982) (United States Air Force
aircraft investigation report); see also Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prods. Co., 602 F.
Supp. 1071, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (affidavit of FDA official involved in official
investigation).
29. See Chatangco v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476, 481 (1910); Smith v. New Dixie
Lines, 201 Va. 466, 472, 111 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1959). See generally Hinton, Judgment of Conviction-Effect in a Civil Case as Res Judicata or as Evidence, 27
ILL. L. REV. 195, 196 (1932) (citing "the great mass of decisions that a judgment
of conviction does not conclude the convict in a subsequent civil action between him and a stranger as to the existence of the facts on which the prosecution was based"). Part IV will discuss the mutuality requirement and its
abandonment in greater detail. See infra notes 216-240 and accompanying
text.
The government occasionally brings both criminal and civil cases. See Local 167, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934);
United States v. Monkey, 725 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1984).
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later civil litigation, it was conceivable that convicted criminals
might escape civil liability for their crimes, or possibly even
benefit from them. Some courts regarded this result as unacceptable and began admitting prior convictions into evidence.
In typical early cases, courts admitted arson convictions in subsequent civil suits brought by the arsonist to recover fire insurance proceeds. 30
Rules of evidence now generally provide that criminal convictions are admissible under an exception to the rule against
hearsay. The Federal Rules, 3 1 for example, provide that a conviction of a serious crime is admissible to prove any fact essential to the conviction. 32 The rationale behind the exception is
30. See, e.g., Wolff v. Employers' Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 833, 140
S.W.2d 640, 645 (1940); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 314, 179 N.E.
711, 712 (1932). See generally Thau, CollateralEstoppel and the Reliability of
Criminal Determinations: Theoretical, Practical, and Strategic Implications
for Criminal and Civil Litigation, 70 GEo. L.J. 1079, 1089 (1982) ("Reluctant
to break with tradition, courts gingerly permitted various forms of nonconclusive use.").
31. Rule 803(22) provides a hearsay exception for:
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person
guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of
one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not
including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution
for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons
other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but
does not affect admissibility.
FED. R. EvID. 803(22).
Rule 803(22) expressly excludes convictions based on nolo contendere
pleas. It also excludes convictions of "persons other than the accused" when
offered by the government in criminal prosecutions "for purposes other than
impeachment." Id. This restriction stems from the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment. See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-61 (1899);
United States v. Koger, 646 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (7th Cir. 1981); FED. R. Evm.
803(22) advisory committee note. Thus, in a later criminal case, the government can use the conviction of a different defendant to show the fact of conviction, or for impeachment, but not to prove facts essential to the conviction.
This restriction limits neither use of the prior conviction by the accused, nor
use of prior convictions as evidence in later civil suits. Finally, a statute may
override Rule 803(22) to prohibit admission of certain criminal convictions.
For example, § 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that "consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken" in a criminal antitrust
prosecution are not to be used as evidence. Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(a) (1982). See generally 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15,
§ 470, at 909 n.36; Comment, The Use of Government Judgments in Private
Antitrust Litigation: Clayton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel and Jury
Tria 43 U. CmI. L. REv. 338, 361-65 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Government Judgments].
32. Most commentators support the exception. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 15, § 470, at 887-89, McCORMICK, supra note 5, § 318, at
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that criminal convictions are reliable and trustworthy.3 3 There
is a strong incentive to defend against serious charges. Moreover, convictions after trial must meet a high standard of proof,
and guilty pleas are subject to parallel safeguards.m
As time passed, courts slowly began to carve out an exception to the mutuality rule for criminal convictions, and collateral estoppel came into use. Courts and commentators cited
the higher standard of proof required in criminal cases and policy reasons similar to those for admitting convictions into evidence as justifications for giving prior convictions collateral
35
estoppel effect.
As with admission into evidence, courts first allowed a
prior conviction to be collateral estoppel if it would prevent a
convicted criminal from benefitting from the crime. In a leading early case, Eagle, Star & British Dominions Insurance Co.
v. Heller,3 6 the Virginia Supreme Court recognized an arson
conviction as collateral estoppel and foiled the convicted arsonist's attempt to collect on a fire insurance policy.3 7 This idea
gradually expanded and courts allowed the offensive use of a
prior conviction as collateral estoppel. 38 For example, a later
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supranote 4, %803(22)[01], at 803-352; 5
J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1671a, at 806-13. For historical background, see
Bush, Criminal Convictions as Evidence in Civil Proceedings, 29 MIss. L.J.
276, 277-78 (1958).
33. See United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1983); 4 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 470, at 887-88.
34. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 687
(8th Cir. 1968).
35. See, e.g., Teitlebaum Furs, Inc., v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601,
606, 375 P.2d 439, 441, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 561 (1962); Hinton, supra note 29, at
196 ("[T]he argument for the binding effect of a criminal conviction is based
on the rule that in criminal prosecutions the necessary facts must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and hence that it is certain that the defendant was
really guilty.").
36. 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
37. Heller, 149 Va. at 111, 140 S.E. at 323 ("To permit a recovery under a
policy of fire insurance by one who has been convicted of burning the property
insured, would be to disregard the contract, be illogical, would discredit the administration of justice, defy public policy and shock the most unenlightened

894-95; 4 J.

conscience.").
38. See Cardillo v. Zyla, 486 F.2d 473, 475-76 (1st Cir. 1973) (prior conviction for conspiracy and transporting stolen goods is basis for collateral estoppel
in civil action brought by the convicted party against others for their alleged
perjury that led to his conviction); Breeland v. Security Ins. Co., 421 F.2d 918,
923 (5th Cir. 1969) (prior conviction for fraud in connection with fire insurance
claim acts as collateral estoppel on issue of fraud in a suit brought by insured
to recover on the policy); Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 182
F. Supp. 633, 634-35 (D. Kan. 1967) (prior conviction for manslaughter acts by
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civil plaintiff could rely on the conviction to establish an element of the claim against a criminal. Courts first allowed government agencies 39 and then private litigants40 to recover the
proceeds of a crime in this manner. As the mutuality requirement eroded away, collateral estoppel for criminal convictions
stopped being an exception and became well established under
general principles. 41 By then, however, the use of criminal convictions as evidence had also become firmly entrenched. 42
The net result is that findings in criminal convictions, like
administrative findings, enjoy a range of subsequent effect in
collateral estoppel to determine the issue of felonious intent in a suit where
the convicted beneficiary of a life insurance policy seeks to recover under the

policy); Scott v. Robertson, 583 P.2d 188, 193 (Alaska 1978) (prior conviction of
plaintiff while intoxicated is conclusive of the facts necessarily proved for the
conviction, in a suit plaintiff brings alleging that defendant's negligent driving
caused his injuries). See generally 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4,
%803(22)[01], at 803-357 ("[c]ourts have been particularly prone to apply a conclusive effect when it would bar a criminal from profiting by the act for which
he was convicted").
39. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 412 Pa. 222, 226-30, 194 A.2d 423, 426-27 (1963).
40. See Hardin v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 384 F.2d 718, 719 (5th Cir.
1967), cert denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968); Bressan Export-Import Co. v. Conlew,
346 F. Supp. 683, 685 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Moore, 306 F. Supp. 1088, 1095 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa 493,
496-99, 206 A.2d 624, 625-26, cert denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85 comment e (1982); see
also United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968, 972 (5th Cir. 1983) (collateral estoppel operates against defendant earlier convicted of false statements concerning eligibility for farm subsidy programs); United States v. Podell, 572
F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978) (collateral estoppel justifies summary judgment in
civil suit against defendant earlier convicted of conspiracy to violate federal
conflict of interest statute); United States v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (prior conviction for conspiracy and racketeering acts as collateral estoppel in restitution proceeding brought by United States). Cases generally hold that collateral estoppel does not apply to acquittals because of the
standard of proof required to convict. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones & One
Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235 (1972) (per curiam); Helvering v.
Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 85
comment g (1982). Convictions for minor crimes are also ineligible because defendants have limited incentive to contest and because procedures often are
summary. See Scott v. Robertson, 583 P.2d 188, 192 (Alaska 1978); Gilberg v.
Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285, 292-93, 423 N.E.2d 807, 809-10, 441 N.Y.S.2d 49, 51-52
(1981).
42. Even now, courts admit criminal convictions into evidence if the application of collateral estoppel is uncertain. See Adventure RV Rentals, Inc. v.
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 562 F. Supp. 445, 447-48 (N.D. Ind. 1983); cf. Bower v.
O'Hara, 759 F.2d 1117, 1124-27 (3d Cir. 1985) (guilty plea not collateral estoppel but admissible into evidence); Brown v. Green, 738 F.2d 202, 205-09 (7th
Cir. 1984) (same as to conviction).
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later civil litigation.43 They may be collateral estoppel, admissible as evidence, or inadmissible for any purpose. Again, neither
the case law nor the literature explains why criminal convictions should have a greater opportunity to influence subsequent
litigation than do other types of judgments."

C. AnTITRUST JUDGMENTS
Enforcement of the antitrust laws is based on a policy of
parallel government and private action. The Department of
Justice may bring civil and criminal actions against violators
when it is in the public interest to do so. 45 At the same time,
"[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" may
bring a private action for treble damages.46 This has been the
basic enforcement scheme since the Sherman Act was passed in
1890.47
By 1914, Congress had concluded that the Sherman Act's
treble damage provision was not providing a sufficient inducement to private enforcement actions. Few private parties could
afford to mount an antitrust suit,48 and even where prior government litigation had been successful, the defendant could
force a private plaintiff to relitigate all previously decided issues. The mutuality requirement, which was then firmly entrenched, kept a nonparty to the earlier government proceeding
43. See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53

CALIF.

L. REV. 25,

29 n.12 (1965) ("It is important to note the dichotomy that is developing use

of the prior judgment collaterally in the civil action, or use merely as evidence
in the civil action."). The drafters of the Federal Rules stated that Rule
803(22) "does not deal with the substantive effect of the judgment as a bar or
collateral estoppel." It only addresses whether a prior conviction is "admissible in evidence for what it is worth" when "the doctrine of res judicata does
not apply to make the judgment either a bar or a collateral estoppel." FEM. R.
EvM. 803(22) advisory committee note.
44. Criminal judgments may deserve more deference than ordinary civil
judgments. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt and other procedural protections
may make criminal convictions more reliable. However, if civil judgments really were significantly less reliable, they would not enjoy collateral estoppel
effect as much as they do.
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 4 (1982).
46. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Private parties may also obtain
injunctive relief under Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
47. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
48. See S. REP.No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 627,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914); Trusts and Monopolies, Address of the President
of the United States Before the Joint Session of Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 625,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914).
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from using it as collateral estoppel. 49
Congress considered two ways of resolving this problem.
The House wanted to make findings in government suits collateral estoppel in later private antitrust litigation, not only
against, but also for defendants in government suits. 50 In response to objections that this would violate due process, the
House eliminated the provision binding private plaintiffs if the
defendant won the government suit, but retained the provision
allowing conclusive effect against losing defendants. 51 The Senate, however, decided that allowing private plaintiffs to use
findings from the government suit to collaterally estop defendants, because inconsistent with the mutuality rule, would be an
impermissible violation of due process. 52 The Senate view
prevailed.
The enacted version of section 5(a) made prior findings
"prima facie evidence" to the extent that parties to the earlier
litigation could assert them as collateral estoppel.5 3 The intent
was "to minimize the burdens of litigation for injured private
suitors by making available to them all matters previously established by the Government in antitrust actions."' '
As Congress later explained, the statute "gave an antitrust plaintiff
49. See Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248
U.S. 55, 63 (1918); Keokuk & W.R.R. Co. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301, 317 (1894);
H.R. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 & n.1, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2752, 2755.
50. See 51 CONG. REC. 9200 (1914) (statement of Rep. Green); id. at 13,85157 (Senate debate concerning the requirement of mutuality of estoppel).
51. See id at 9911.
52. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914); see also 51 CONG. REC.
13,851 (1914) (statement of Sen. Walsh); id. at 13,853 (statement of Sen.
Chilton); id. at 13,854 (statement of Sen. Chilton); id. at 13,900 (statement of
Sen. White). Some Representatives had also raised these doubts. See id. at
9487 (statement of Rep. Volstead); id. at 9491 (statement of Rep. Green).
53. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982)). For discussion of the enactment of § 5(a), see McWillianas,FederalAntitrust Decrees: Should They Be Given Conclusive Effect in a
Subsequent PrivateAction?, 48 Miss. L.J. 1, 11-17 (1977); Comment, Government Judgments, supra note 31, at 340-44; Note, Section 5(a) of the Clayton
Act and Offensive CollateralEstoppel in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE
L.J. 541, 548-50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Section 5(a)].
54. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1951).
Several cases suggest an additional purpose: to encourage defe.-idants to enter
into consent judgments, which do not have evidentiary effect. See Illinois v.
Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., 442 F. Supp. 56, 57 (S.D. IM. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 59
(D. Minn. 1966), afftd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967).
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more than the common law then permitted, and
as much as
55
was thought to be constitutionally permissible."
Collateral estoppel rules changed with the passage of time.
As a matter of general doctrine, courts gradually abandoned
the mutuality requirement. 5 6 At the same time, they continued
to use section 5(a) to admit antitrust judgments as prima facie
evidence.57 The relationship between section 5(a) and collateral
estoppel became unclear. Some courts concluded that prior
government antitrust judgments could affect later private actions through section 5(a), which, in their view, preempted general collateral estoppel rules in antitrust cases. 58 Other courts
and commentators urged that evidentiary effect under section
5(a) was a minimum standard only and that collateral estoppel
should be available whenever general doctrine permitted. 59
In 1980, Congress amended section 5(a) to adopt this latter
55. H.R. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2752, 2753-58; see also International Tel. & Tel.

Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 444 F. Supp. 1148, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (observing that § 5(a) was designed to expand the rights of private antitrust plaintiffs). The seventh amendment right to jury trial was also an obstacle to
collateral estoppel, but only in some cases. See 51 CONG. REC. 9492 (1914)
(statement of Rep. Prouty); MeWilliams, supra note 53, at 13; Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v.
Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 445-55 (1971); Note, Mutuality of Estoppel and the
Seventh Amendment" The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64 CORNELL L. REV.

1002, 1007-09 & nn.25-27, 1018-28 (1979); Note, Section 5(a), supra note 53, at
546 n.13; Comment, Government Judgments, supra note 31, at 365-75.
56. See infra notes 216-240 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
58. See Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680, 681-83 (7th Cir. 1979),
rev'g Illinois v. Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., 442 F. Supp. 56, 59 (S.D. Ill.
1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); cf Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United
States, 366 U.S. 683, 690 (1961) (§ 5 of Clayton Act, making an adjudication of
liability in a government action prima facie evidence of liability in a private
suit, seems a definite legislative pronouncement that government litigation
does not preclude private litigation); Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271
F.2d 709, 723-28 (9th Cir. 1959) (decree in prior government antitrust action is
prima facie rather than conclusive evidence under § 5(a)), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 961 (1960); Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584, 589-90
(C.D. Cal. 1970) (same), affd on other grounds, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied 405 U.S. 1065 (1972). See generally H.R. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3, reprintedin 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2752, 2754; Note,
Government Antitrust Judgments as Evidence in PrivateActions, 65 HARv. L.
REV. 1400, 1407 (1952).
59. See Illinois v. Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., 442 F. Supp. 56, 59 (S.D.
Ill. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680, 681-83
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); McWilliams, supra note 53, at 1-2,
8; Comment, Government Judgments, supra note 31, at 374-75.
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view.60 The legislative history of the amendment observed that
allowing collateral estoppel in antitrust cases "eliminates
wasteful retrying of issues and thereby reduces the costs of litigation to the courts and the parties. '6 1 Congress concluded that
the original section 5(a) could not have preempted a collateral
estoppel doctrine that did not exist, and that it would be anomalous and unfair to deny collateral estoppel to government antitrust judgments that would otherwise be included under
modern collateral estoppel doctrine. 62 Thus, since 1980, private
plaintiffs have been able to use antitrust judgments along a
63
continuum of effect from evidence to collateral estoppel.
60. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349,
94 Stat. 1154 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982)). Similar proposals were rejected in 1950, 1955, and 1966. See Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680,
683 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); Note, Section 5(a), supra note
53, at 549-54. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act currently provides:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United
States under the antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in
any action or proceeding brought by any other party against such defendant under said laws as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to impose any limitation on
the application of collateral estoppel, except that, in any action or proceeding brought under the antitrust laws, collateral estoppel effect
shall not be given to any finding made by the Federal Trade Commission under the antitrust laws or under section 45 of this title which
could give rise to a claim for relief under the antitrust laws.
Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
61. H.R. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 2752, 2753; see also Oberweis Dairy v. Associated Milk
Producers, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 962, 968-69 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (1980 amendment intended to override prior court decisions precluding full collateral estoppel effect); Antitrust Procedural Improvements and JurisdictionalAmendments:
Hearings on H.R 327 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-52 (1979)
(testimony of Sen. Metzenbaum) (stressing the need to eliminate wasteful delays in enforcement of antitrust laws).
62. See H.R. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2752, 2755.
63. See Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
740 F.2d 1011, 1020-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Oberweis Dairy v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 962, 966-70 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Section 5(a) and Rule
803(22) also overlap. Courts use § 5(a) to admit guilty pleas in prior criminal
antitrust cases, but nolo contendere pleas are considered consent decrees excluded from § 5(a). See City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825,
831-35 (9th Cir. 1964); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.,
323 F.2d 412, 413-17 (7th Cir. 1963), cert denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
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STATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION FINDINGS

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 allows both state
and federal agencies to investigate and decide employment discrimination claims.6 Typically, the claimant must first file
with the appropriate state or local agency, which has exclusive
jurisdiction for sixty days. 65 If the state or local agency acts,
the matter can stay in the state system if any party seeks state
court review. After the sixty days have expired, or following
an unfavorable resolution by the state agency or court, the
claimant may file the charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which then has exclusive jurisdiction for 180 days to find "reasonable
cause" to
66
believe that a Title VII violation has occurred.
The EEOC lacks the authority to enjoin violations or order
affirmative action, but after thirty days from the receipt of the
charge, it may file suit in its own name in federal district
court.6 7 If the EEOC sues, the claimant may intervene but may

not sue separately. 68 If the EEOC declines to sue, it issues a
"right to sue letter," which gives the claimant ninety days to

64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Title
VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). For a summary of employment discrimination law, see generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRMNATION LAW (2d ed. 1983).

65. The statute provides:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State... which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or
local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice
thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) [sic] of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after
proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
Title VII, § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(c) (1982). Claimants must file charges
within 180 days following the act complained of. Title VII, § 706(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 20OOe-5(e) (1982).
66. Title VII, § 706(b), (f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (1982). See also
Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1972) (EEOC may file complaint
with state on complainant's behalf and hold complaint in "suspended animation" pending termination of state proceedings). An EEOC finding of no "reasonable cause" does not bind federal courts. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99 (1973). However, courts sometimes admit such
findings into evidence as administrative findings. See Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576, 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
67. Title VII, § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
68. Id-
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sue in federal district court. 69 Federal courts may enjoin violations and order affirmative action to remedy the effects of un70
lawful discrimination.
Until 1982, most federal courts held that state agency and
state court findings were not res judicata 7 ' and thus had no
binding effect in later federal Title VII litigation. 72 This widespread refusal to regard state determinations as collateral estoppel threatened to leave them totally without influence in
subsequent federal proceedings. Courts responded by admitting
state findings into evidence. For example, a Seventh Circuit
panel stated that "the prior state record could have been introduced and stipulated as containing all the pertinent evidence
and the court could have based its determination on that evidence without a new trial," although it was "required to examine that evidence and make its own findings." 73 According
to the Third Circuit, the proper approach was "to give the
agency's conclusions appropriate but not necessarily controlling
69.

Id.

70.

Title VII, § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).

71. See Aleem v. General Felt Indus., 661 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1981);
Lyght v. Ford Motor Co., 643 F.2d 435, 438 (6th Cir. 1981); Gunther v. Iowa
State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1082-85 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 446
U.S. 966 (1980); Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330, 1335-38 (5th Cir. 1978); Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1120, 1121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
72. Courts faced with this issue relied heavily on Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), in which the Court held that arbitral findings
under a collective bargaining agreement are not binding in later Title VII litigation. Id. at 59-60. Using the analogy to Alexander, courts developed three
basic lines of reasoning. First, preclusive effect for state proceedings would defeat Congress's intent that state and federal remedies overlap. See Unger v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 913 (7th Cir. 1981), vacated, 456 U.S.
1002 (1982); Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam). Second, the federal system has final responsibility for enforcement
of Title VII, especially in light of the addition in the 1972 amendments that the
EEOC "shall accord substantial weight" to state proceedings. Title VII,
§ 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982); see Unger, 657 F.2d at 915; Smouse, 626
F.2d at 335 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)); see also Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 488 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Third, binding effect
for findings by a state agency with less procedural protection than a federal
court "might well frustrate the broad remedial purpose of Title VII." Smouse,
626 F.2d at 335; see Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1972);
see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-57 (1974) (arbitral
procedures make arbitration an inappropriate forum for final resolution of
rights under Title VII); Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of
Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1485,
1519-20 (1981); Note, Res Judicatain Successive Employment Discrimination
Suits, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 1049, 1099.
73. Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974).
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weight." 74 Other cases provided for evidentiary treatment in
similar terms. 75
In 1982, in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,7 6 the
United States Supreme Court held that a state agency finding
upheld by a state court is binding in later federal Title VII
litigation. 77 The plaintiff, Kremer, had first filed his discrimination claim with a New York state agency, which found no
reasonable cause to believe a violation had occurred. A state
court reviewed and upheld the agency determination. 7
Kremer took his case to the EEOC, which also found no reasonable cause and issued a right-to-sue letter. Kremer then sued
in federal district court under Title VII.79 The employer argued that the state determinations barred the federal suit, and
the Supreme Court agreed. 0
Justice White, writing for a majority of five,81 reasoned
that Congress did not intend Title VII, even with its provision
for a federal trial de novo, to override 28 U.S.C. section 1738,82
74. Smouse v. General Elec. Co., 626 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 n.14, 60 n.21 (1974)).
75. See Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 (7th Cir.
1981) ("evidence to be accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate,"
but trial court committed no reversible error in its refusal to accord greater
weight to the contrary legal conclusions of the state proceedings), vacated, 456
U.S. 1002 (1982); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079,
1084-85 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) ("the prior state proceedings are entitled to weight in the federal district court's factual determinations"); Cooper v. Philip Morris, Inc., 464 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1972) (quoting
Title VII, § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)) ("accord substantial weight to final
[state agency] findings and orders"); see also Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 505 n.19 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("no one disputes that state court affirmances 'may be admitted as evidence and accorded
such weight as the [federal] court deems appropriate' ") (quoting Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974)).
The exception among the courts of appeals was the Second Circuit, which
held in Sinicropi v. Nassau County, 601 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979), that a state agency determination would be binding
in later federal Title VII litigation, at least if the state court had affirmed on
review sought by the claimant. Id at 61-62. Eventually, the Supreme Court
adopted a position close to the Second Circuit's. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466-72 (1982).
76. 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
77. Id, at 476.
78. Id. at 464.
79. Id, at 463-66.
80. Id. at 473-76.
81. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. See
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 486-511 (dissenting opinions).
82. Id. at 473-76. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) provides that the "judicial proceedings [of any court of any state] shall have the same full faith and credit in
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which requires the federal courts to give full faith and credit to
state court decisions. Thus a state court's affirmance of a state
agency finding is binding in a later federal Title VII suit if it
would be binding in state court.8 3
Kremer and other cases seem to say that state agency findings not reviewed by state courts are not binding on the federal
courts.8 4 Some courts, however, hold that state administrative

findings are binding in federal court if the administrative tribunal was acting in a judicial capacity when rendering its decision.8 5 If the view that unreviewed state agency findings and
findings made by an administrative tribunal not acting in an adjudicative capacity are not binding prevails, these findings presumably would still be admissible as evidence, as all state
findings had been before Kremer.8 6 Thus, once confined to inevery court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as
they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ....." In applying 28

U.S.C. § 1738 to the analogous state-federal preclusion issue in civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Supreme Court has given prior state determinations the same effect in federal courts as they would have in the state
courts. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd.of Educ., 104 S.Ct. 892, 89798 (1984). See generally Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A
Reappraisa4 63 N.C.L. RsV. 59, 119-23 (1984).
83. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-72. The Court dismissed the argument that
these particular proceedings were so procedurally deficient that they should
not bind federal courts. Id. at 477-78. But cf.Patzer v. Board of Regents of
University of Wis. Sys., 763 F.2d 851, 857 (7th Cir. 1985) (judgment not on
merits); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 361-62 (4th Cir.
1985) (issues not identical).
84. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.7. Most post-Kremer cases so hold. See
Heath v. John Morrell & Co., 768 F.2d 245, 248 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 106 S.
Ct. 522 (1985) (No. 85-588); Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982, 987-89
(6th Cir. 1985); Bottini v. Sadore Management Corp., 764 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir.
1985); Burney v. Polk Community College, 728 F.2d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir. 1984);
Reedy v. Florida Dep't of Educ., 605 F. Supp. 172, 173-74 (N.D. Fla. 1985);
Mitchell v. Bendix Corp., 603 F. Supp. 920, 921-22 (N.D. Ind. 1985); see also
Note, If You Do Not Succeed at Firs Do Not Bother Trying Again: Should
Res JudicataPrinciplesPrevent Title VII Claims That Are Unreviewed by the
State CourtFrom Proceedingto the FederalCourt 54 U. CIN. L. REv. 649, 66063 (1985); Note, Res Judicata Effects of State Agency Decisions in Title VII
Actions, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 695, 708-15 (1985).
85. See Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 768 F.2d 842, 853-55
(7th Cir. 1985); Zywicki v. Moxness Prods., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 50, 52 (E.D. Wis.
1985); O'Hara v. Board of Educ., 590 F. Supp. 696, 701-03 (D.N.J. 1984), affid
mem., 760 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1985); see also United Farm Workers v. Arizona
Agricultural Employment Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982)
("decisions of the courts or administrative agencies of one state are entitled to
the same res judicata effect in all other states as they enjoy in the state of
rendition").
86. See Snow v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 543 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D. Nev.
1982) (citing Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470-72 & n.8). The Supreme Court also re-
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fluence through evidentiary treatment, state employment discrimination findings can now influence later federal litigation
along a continuum from admission as evidence to collateral
estoppel.
E.

JUDGMENTS OF PATENT VALIDITY

There can be no collateral estoppel in the typical patent validity case, because collateral estoppel operates only against
87
parties to the prior proceeding and those in privity with them.
A patentee cannot use a prior finding of patent validity to collaterally estop a different alleged infringer, who was not a
party to the prior proceeding, from contesting the validity of
88

the patent.

With collateral estoppel categorically unavailable, the only
alternative to completely disregarding prior findings of validity
was to admit them into evidence, 9 and courts have consistently
done so. The Seventh Circuit, which has produced the largest
number of cases, calls this the "Rovico rule" after a 1967 case, 90

but the rule is older than that by at least fifty years.9 1 Its purpose is to relieve a patent holder of the expense and uncer-

tainty of reestablishing validity from scratch whenever the
cently reaffirmed that under Alexander arbitral findings are admissible into
evidence in federal court litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. McDonald v. City
of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1804 n.13 (1984); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 n.22 (1981) (weight to be accorded
an arbitral decision to be determined by the court) (quoting Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974)). But cf. Mitchell v. Bendix Corp.,
603 F. Supp. 920, 921-22 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (court holds unreviewed state administrative finding is not collateral estoppel and "therefore irrelevant," but no indication that proponent moved for admission into evidence).
87. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34 (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MLER &
E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4449, at 411.
88. Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng'g Indus., 693 F.2d 1140, 1144 n.6 (5th Cir.
1982); Sidewinder Marine, Inc. v. Starbuck Kustom Boats & Prods., Inc., 597
F.2d 201, 206 (10th Cir. 1979); American Safety Flight Sys. v. Garrett Corp., 528
F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1975).
89. At least one court has expressly held that admission into evidence
against a nonparty is consistent with due process precisely because it involves
evidence rather than collateral estoppel. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 391 F. Supp. 780, 786 (N.D. IMI. 1975).
90. American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 384 F.2d 813, 815-17
(7th Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
91. See Federal Elec. Co. v. Flexlume Corp., 33 F.2d 412, 413 (7th Cir.),
cert denied, 280 U.S. 590 (1929); Freeman-Sweet Co. v. Luminous Unit Co.,
264 F. 107, 108 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 253 U.S. 486 (1920); Penfield v. C. & A.
Potts & Co., 126 F. 475, 478 (6th Cir. 1903).
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patent is challenged. 92
The Seventh Circuit has explained that "Rovico seems a
sensible and just means of avoiding wasteful, repeated de novo
examination of an issue. 93 Some decisions cite goals of repose
and respect for the decisions of other courts, 94 while others
point out that patent litigation is particularly expensive. 95 Still
other cases describe the rule as an application of stare decisis.
One of these said that Rovico is a recognition of the principle
that validity is an issue of law and as long as the facts are the
96
same, the issue of law remains the same.
The cases differ in their descriptions of the weight they assign a prior finding, but they agree in general approach. The
Seventh Circuit cases typically say that the alleged infringer's
burden is to show a "material distinction" between the two
cases and present "persuasive new evidence." 9 7 Other courts
require the alleged infringer to show that the prior finding of
validity suffers from "'very palpable error.' "98 Some courts
92. Patentees enjoy a favored legal position even without the Rovico rule.
A federal statute codifies the common-law presumption that patents are valid.
See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Laboratories, 293 U.S. 1, 7 (1934); 35
U.S.C. § 282 (1982). An alleged infringer who claims that a patent is invalid
has a heavy burden of persuasion on that issue. See Mumm v. Jacob E.
Decker & Sons, 301 U.S. 168, 171 (1937); Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber &
Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1057, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981).
93. Illinois Tool Works v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300, 1303 (7th Cir.
1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977).
94. See Pachmayr Gun Works v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d
802, 806 (9th Cir. 1974).
95. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313, 334-49 (1971). One lower court has viewed Blonder-Tongue as an explicit recognition that patent litigation is costly and time consuming. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 391 F. Supp. 780, 786 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
96. Illinois Tool Works v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300, 1302-03 (7th
Cir. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977); see also Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 711 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1983). But see 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 147 (Rovico rule cases "change
the ordinary rules of evidence in a much more particularized way than results
from ordinary concepts of stare decisis.").
97. Rovico, 384 F.2d at 815-16; see also Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Howmet
Corp., 524 F.2d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 1975); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Sweetheart Plastics, Inc., 436 F.2d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir.), cert dismissed, 403 U.S. 942
(1971); cf.Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 391 F. Supp. 780,
786 (N.D. IM. 1975) (must show error in the prior finding or that the "previous
litigation was incomplete in some material aspect").
98. See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Lockwood Mfg. Co., 483 F.2d 1120,
1125 (6th Cir. 1973) (quoting Cold Metal Process Co. v. Republic Steel Corp.,
233 F.2d 828, 837 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 352 U.S. 891 (1956)), cert denied, 414
U.S. 1158 (1974).
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are less precise but still plainly give the prior finding some
weight short of collateral estoppel. 99
Although the historical development of evidentiary treatment for patent validity findings is largely similar to the other
four categories, patent cases differ in one important respect.
Collateral estoppel doctrine has not expanded to the point
where it includes patent validity findings. Courts still honor
the general rule restricting the application of collateral estoppel to parties and their privies. The result is that admission
into evidence remains the only way for a finding of patent validity to influence later litigation.
F.

OTHER ADMISSIBLE JUDGMENTS

Courts have also admitted into evidence many judgments
outside these five categories. Judgments from foreign countries
have served as "prima facie evidence" in litigation in the
United States. 0 0 Early cases under the full faith and credit
statute considered whether a federal court would give an earlier state judgment conclusive or evidentiary effect. 10 ' Some
courts have admitted judgments against a partner into evidence
in later litigation involving a copartner,' 0 2 and other courts admit a judgment against a principal obligor into evidence in later
litigation involving a surety. 0 3 The Federal Rules of Evidence
allow certain judgments to be used as evidence of "personal,
family, or general history, or boundaries."'1 4 Some courts ad99. See Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng'g Laboratories, Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 8
(1934) (stare decisis will result in prior finding of validity being adhered to in
subsequent action if "substantial identity of evidence"); Stevenson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 711 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (weight "Will vary depending on the additional prior art or other evidence on patentability that is
produced in the subsequent suit"); Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng'g Indus., 693
F.2d 1140, 1144 (5th Cir. 1982) (prior finding is not dispositive but is relevant
evidence to be considered by the trier of fact); General Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 F.2d 1105, 1115-16 (6th Cir. 1973) (prior finding cannot be ignored), cert denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
100. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227-28 (1895). More recent cases,
however, tend to recognize them as binding in later United States litigation.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).

101. See Hampton v. M'Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235 (1818); Mills v.
Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813).
102.

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 60 comment a

& reporter's note to comment d (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. M=LLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 1, § 4449, at 418 n.21.
103. See Note, Judgments,supra note 5, at 409.
104. FED. R. EvID. 803(23). They are admissible if the matters are "essential to the judgment," provided they "would be provable by evidence of reputation." See Grant Bros. Constr. Co. v. United States, 232 U.S. 647, 663 (1914);
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mit prior judgments which decided the same issue being
contested in later litigation, but with reference to an earlier
time. Courts also have admitted other judgments that do not
lend themselves to categorization. 1°5 Several of these are colcommentary that describes their occurrence as
lected in one
"sporadic."1 0 6
It is therefore apparent that, despite the conventional wisdom that prior findings affect later litigation either through
collateral estoppel or not at all, many findings are admissible as
evidence in later civil litigation. The reason that some categories of prior findings are admissible and some are not is essentially historical. For various doctrinal reasons, findings in these
five categories originally were deemed ineligible for collateral
estoppel treatment. Courts, not wanting to completely ignore
prior findings in these categories, used admission into evidence
as a substitute that would give them some effect on later litigation.10 7 Over time, the scope of collateral estoppel expanded to
include these previously excluded categories.10 8 By that time,
evidentiary treatment was firmly entrenched, and findings in
these categories came to enjoy what amounts to preferential
United States v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 67 F.2d 37, 43-44 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 702 (1933); 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15,
§ 471, at 916-21.
105. See Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251, 1256 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1975);
Koch v. United States, 457 F.2d 230, 235-36 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Taylor, 437 F.2d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 1971); Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144
F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 728 (1944); State v. Messier, 114
Ariz. 522, 526, 562 P.2d 402, 406 (Ct. App. 1977). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment c & reporter's note (1982); 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, §§ 4416-4417, at 146, 160-61 &

n.31.
106. 18 C. WRGHT, A. M=ILER, & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 148;
see, e.g., Midgett v. United States, 603 F.2d 835, 845-48 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (state
court finding in in rem proceeding that soldier had died on the day of his disappearance in Vietnam admitted to show he did not desert).
107. See supra notes 11-99 and accompanying text. One commentator's approach to administrative findings implicitly confirms this analysis. Professor
Rex Perschbacher argues that administrative findings generally are too informal and too often biased by agency policies to merit collateral estoppel. He
argues that administrative findings should be rebuttably presumed not to be
collateral estoppel, as they were before Utah Construction. He then suggests,
without extended discussion, that they be admitted into evidence, thus adopting the same approach that courts once used to compensate for the lack of collateral estoppel. This would approximate the situation prior to Utah
Construction. See Perschbacher, supra note 8, at 452, 454-55, 459-62.
108. Patent validity findings, however, are still not given collateral estoppel effect. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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treatment-a full continuum of effect from use as evidence to
collateral estoppel.
This historical explanation for how judgments in certain
categories came to be used as evidence disproves two alternative hypotheses. First, nothing suggests that courts intentionally restricted the admission of prior findings to those
categories of findings that were especially suited for evidentiary
treatment. Second, nothing suggests that admission into evidence developed as a compromise solution for close individual
cases, in which courts felt the binding effect of collateral estoppel was too harsh yet still wanted to give the prior finding some
effect. After all, prevailing doctrine regarded those groups of
findings as categorically ineligible for collateral estoppel, so
there was no room for "compromise." Although some administrative findings, and perhaps also some state findings in suits on
federal claims, might prompt compromise because they may not
be sufficiently reliable to justify the binding effect of collateral
estoppel, the same can not be said for criminal, antitrust, and
patent findings.
The continuum of effect from evidence to collateral estoppel that is reflected in four of the five categories discussed thus
came into being later, and more by historical accident than by
design or policy, as collateral estoppel expanded. But now that
collateral estoppel includes so many prior findings that formerly could only be admitted into evidence, much of the original impetus for evidentiary treatment has disappeared. This
raises the question whether it makes sense to continue admitting judgments in these four categories into evidence. Does using a prior judgment as evidence serve a different purpose than
using a prior judgment as collateral estoppel? Are there reasons for allowing both types of treatment? If there are, would
those same reasons justify a general rule allowing civil judgments to be used as evidence? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to take a closer look at the policies
underlying collateral estoppel and use of judgments as
evidence.
II.

POLICIES BEHIND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND

USE OF JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE
Three separate goals are commonly advanced in support of
giving collateral estoppel effect to prior judgments.1 0 9 First,
109. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); see also
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there is efficiency: neither courts nor litigants should be burdened with repetitious litigation. 10° Second, there is repose:
lawsuits should provide binding answers so that issues are settled once and for all. 1 1 Third, there is consistency: respect for
the judicial process will be undermined if separate litigation
produces inconsistent results on the same matter. 112
Admitting prior judgments into evidence may not promote
efficiency. Although in some cases the prior finding can abbreviate a lengthy reconsideration of the matter,1 1 3 in most cases it
will not shorten the lawsuit because admitting a prior finding
into evidence still leaves the issue undecided. Yet in many
cases collateral estoppel is also very inefficient. It may simply
substitute one area of contention for another. Instead of arguing the merits of the case, the parties argue about what the
prior litigation decided. 114 And, collateral estoppel often does
not shorten discovery, which is frequently the most time-consuming and expensive part of modern civil litigation. Furthermore, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense and may be
waived. 1 5 Most fundamentally, however, efficiency is difficult
to define as an independent value in litigation. 1 6 As one commentator noted, "[c]ourts exist for the purpose of trying lawsuits. If the courts are too busy to decide cases fairly and on
the merits something is wrong."1 1 7 Efficiency should not be
infra note 112. See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 1, § 4403.
110. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
111. See id. at 153-54.
112. See id.at 154 (collateral estoppel "fosters reliance on judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions"); see also United States v.
Stauffer Chem. Co., 104 S. Ct. 575, 579 (1984); United States v. Mendoza, 104 S.
Ct. 568, 571 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n.6
(1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 12-17.
113. See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works v. Foster Grant Co., 547 F.2d 1300, 130203 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 929 (1977) (evidentiary use of prior
finding of patent validity eliminates need for repeated full scale trials).
114. See, e.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 341-48
(5th Cir. 1982).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also National Treasury Employees Union v.
Internal Revenue Serv., 765 F.2d 1174, 1176 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985); 18 C. WRIGHT,
A. M=LLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4405, at 32-34; Cleary, Res Judicata
Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339, 348-49 (1948).
116. See Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 S.CAL. L. REv. 1036, 1036,
1041 (1971); cf.Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinderor RepresentationDevice?,
1983 SUP. CT. REV. 459, 481-82 (discussing concept of efficiency in class
actions).
117. Cleary, supra note 115, at 348.
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viewed as a purpose of collateral estoppel, but rather as a benefit that may accrue when other factors make binding effect
118
appropriate.
Repose is another argument used to justify the binding effect of collateral estoppel. Repose has been called "the most
important product of res judicata."''119 In one sense, admitting a
prior finding into evidence does not provide repose, because the
other side can still contest the finding. Yet, courts admitting
prior judgments into evidence have observed that repose comes
20
with reliance on earlier decisions.
To the extent that admitting a judgment into evidence
achieves repose, it is not the complete repose that comes with
collateral estoppel, but rather the partial repose that comes
from knowing that prior judgments will be respected and incorporated into a system that tries to achieve consistent results.
This respect for prior judgments and desire for consistent results is the goal most clearly shared by collateral estoppel and
evidence. In his seminal article, Professor Edward Cleary
wrote that "[a]ccording insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and their decisions
and invites litigation."'' 1 Both collateral estoppel and use of
judgments as evidence are devices by which the fact finder in
later litigation will give appropriate weight to prior proceedings. 22 Furthermore, if the parties know that collateral estoppel or evidentiary effect is likely, they will allow the prior
23
judgment to affect negotiation and settlement.
The degree of deference a legal system gives to prior find118. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at
13-14; Flanagan, Offensive Collateral Estoppe: Inefficiency and Foolish Consistency, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 52 (offensive collateral estoppel is not efficient); Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its
Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IowA L. REV.
141, 178-80, 207-12 (1984); Hazard, Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal
System's Interes 70 IowA L. REv. 81, 81-83 (1984) (the fundamental justifications for preclusion rules are epistemological and institutional in nature);
Perschbacher, supra note 8, at 1-49 (judicial economy only partially applies to
collateral estoppel); von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 300
(1929) (repose is more important than efficiency).
119. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 15.
120. See Pachmayr Gun Works v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d
802-06 (9th Cir. 1974); Penfield v. C. & A. Potts Co., 126 F. 475, 478 (6th Cir.
1903).
121. Cleary, supra note 115, at 345; see also Flanagan, supra note 118, at
49; Perschbacher, supra note 8, at 445.
122. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
123. See Green, supra note 118, at 180-83; Palmer, supra note 8, at 156.
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ings is an indication of how seriously the legal system regards
those findings. It also reflects how seriously the legal system
views itself or, if it did not make the finding, how seriously it
views the system that made it.'2A The degree of deference
given to prior judgments also helps to determine whether an
inevitably imperfect system can achieve the consistency of results that is the basis of public respect. 125
Whether any deference will be given to a prior judgment
depends largely on our confidence that it is "reliable," in the
sense that we believe it accurately ascertains historical truth.
A leading commentary observes that "hearsay is excludable because it is generally less reliable than live testimony.'26 Live
testimony is considered more reliable because it is given under
oath, in the personal presence of the trier of fact, and is subject
to cross-examination. 2 7 The exceptions to the rule against
hearsay are justified on grounds that substitute assurances of
reliability or "trustworthiness" are present. 2 8 Even though
124. Cf Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 575 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (repetitive litigation is to be avoided to "establish certainty and respect for court
judgments"); Mercantile Nat'1 Bank v. Howmet Corp., 524 F.2d 1031, 1032 (7th
Cir. 1975) (Rovico rule designed to promote "stability in the law and judicial
economy"), cert denied, 424 U.S. 957 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDMENTS introduction, at 11-13 (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 1, § 4403, at 12 ("The most purely public purpose served by res judicata lies in preserving the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against
the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results."); Palmer, supra note 8, at 153, 155 (not admitting criminal convictions into evidence is "somewhat of a denigration of the
adversary process and judicial system"; "policy demands that the findings cannot be ignored").
125. See Hazard, supra note 118, at 82-83.
126. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELL.ER supra note 15, § 413, at 69; see also
Southmark Properties v. Charles House Corp., 742 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir.
1984); MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 245, at 726-28; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4,
800[01], at 800-10 to -11; Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87
HARV. L. REv. 957, 958-59 (1974).
127. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 154 (1970); Bartlett v. Kansas
City Pub. Serv. Co., 349 Mo. 13, 20-21, 160 S.W.2d 740, 745 (1942); 5 J. WIG.
MORE, supra note 5, § 1420, at 251.
128. See Frazier v. Continental Oil Co., 568 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 1978)
("dangers inherent in hearsay testimony can be obviated by a requirement
that such statements be trustworthy and necessary"); Sabatino v. Curtiss Nat'l
Bank, 415 F.2d 632, 636 (5th Cir. 1969) (evidence must be "necessary" and "exhibit an intrinsic probability of trustworthiness"), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1057
(1970); Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Reading Co., 3 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D.N.J.
1944) ("The rules of evidence were designed to obtain the truth. They are intended to exclude testimony that is unreliable .... ."); see also 4 D. LOUISELL &
C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 413, at 72-73; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5,
§ 1422, at 253-54 ("circumstantial probability of trustworthiness"). Courts of-

1986]

JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE

1007

this view underlies each hearsay exception, it is most apparent
in the residual exceptions'2 9 which cover statements outside
the enumerated exceptions "but having equivalent guarantees
of trustworthiness."' 3 0
Collateral estoppel shares this basic concern with reliability, and the requirements that must be met to use a prior judgment as collateral estoppel are similar but often stiffer than
those necessary to use a judgment as evidence. For example, an
administrative finding that lacked a hearingl3 or other procedural protections, 132 or that was not necessary to the outcome
of the case,133 cannot be used as collateral estoppel, although it
still may be sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible as evidence under Rule 803(8)(C). Similarly, a finding from a
rulemaking proceeding cannot be used as collateral estoppel, 13
but still may be admissible as evidence.1as Administrative colfer similar reasoning with regard to specific exceptions. See, e.g., United States
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.D.C. 1980) ('"The rationale for the admissibility of factual findings contained in public records... [is]
their fundamental trustworthiness.").
129. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). In pertinent part, the Federal
Rules of Evidence provide exceptions for:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence.
Id. The difference between the two rules is that unavailability of the witness
is a requirement for Rule 804(b)(5) but not for Rule 803(24). See id.
130. See Herdman v. Smith, 707 F.2d 839, 842 (5th Cir. 1983); see Dallas
County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir.
1961); 1 D. LOUiSELL & C. MUELLER, supranote 15, § 29, at 202-04 (1977). Part
VI discusses Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) as possible authority for using prior
judgments as evidence. See infra notes 355-372 and accompanying text.
131. See Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978),
cer denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
498 F. Supp. 353, 365-66 (D.D.C. 1980).
132. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp.
1125, 1148 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in partsub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct.
1348 (1986).
133. See United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, Mich., 577 F.2d 1339,
1349-50 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
134. See, eg., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir.
1978).
135. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany, 586 F. Supp.
711, 725-26 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (army recommendation following its accident inves-
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lateral estoppel is also more difficult to obtain because its pro136
ponent must prove that all of the requirements are met,
while the opponent of admission into evidence must prove a
finding is not trustworthy. 37
Collateral estoppel's severity justifies its stiff requirements
as to reliability. A prior judgment given collateral estoppel effect is conclusive and leaves no opportunity for rebuttal. A
prior judgment admitted into evidence, in contrast, can heavily
influence the outcome of litigation, but is not binding on the
subsequent litigants.
The contrast in reliability standards is a difference in degree, not in kind. A more fundamental difference between collateral estoppel and use of judgments as evidence concerns
overall perspective, especially the nature of policy considerations underlying each one. While admission into evidence is
primarily concerned with reliability, collateral estoppel has always gone further and considered policies that have little or
nothing to do with reliability. These policies often prevent a reliable prior finding from being given collateral estoppel effect.
Numerous examples demonstrate that collateral estoppel
requirements consider policies that go beyond reliability. Take,
for example, the mutuality requirement and the rule against
preclusion of nonparties. Both reflect collateral estoppel's emphasis on the identity of the parties to the prior proceeding.
The reliability of a prior finding, however, depends on how it
was rendered, not on who later uses it as collateral estoppel, or
against whom.138 Similarly, reliability was not the sole justifitigation), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert denied, 106
S. Ct. 85 (1986); Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 653 (D. Nev.
1982) (accident investigation); Sage v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1205,
1209-10 (D.N.H. 1979) (accident investigation); International Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 444 F. Supp. 1148, 1160 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(rulemaking).
136. See Federal Ins. Co. v. United States, 618 F.2d 661, 663 (10th Cir.

1980); Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 277 (8th Cir. 1979); see also 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4405, at 38.

137. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 300-01 (4th Cir.
1984); In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 421 (6th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 793-94 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920
(1979); Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prods. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1071, 1079 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 364 (D.D.C.
1980); FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee note; see also 4 D. LOUISELL &
C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 456, at 766.
138. One commentary notes "the appropriate question in deciding whether
the hearsay objection should be sustained in this context is not the party's opportunity to have been present at the official investigation but rather whether
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cation behind the old rules denying collateral estoppel effect to
administrative findings 139 and state employment discrimination
findings. 140 Even though concerns about reliability may have
been a partial justification, these rules also reflected the view
that collateral estoppel was less appropriate absent the judicial
imprimatur, or absent federal involvement, regardless of reliability in individual cases.
The best explanation for this basic difference in perspective is that collateral estoppel, because of its relative severity,
must be more sensitive to the nature and limits of adjudication.
Litigation is not an infallible determiner of historical truth,
but rather an imperfect exercise that may produce a different
result each time, influenced heavily but unpredictably by the
identity of the parties, the advocates, and the decisionmakers.' 41 As Professor Brainerd Currie pointed out, "ju1
dicial findings must not be confused with absolute truth."'
The very basis of collateral estoppel is that the prior judgment
14 3
is binding even if it is wrong.
Accordingly, the perceived fairness of collateral estoppel
depends to a large extent on factors that do not bear directly on
whether that finding is correct. 1 4" For example, the jury is a legitimizing factor that does not necessarily add to the reliability
of the outcome. 45 Whether a court is state or federal is a similar consideration. The most crucial factor influencing perceived
fairness, however, is the parties' role in the process-whether
they take part and, if so, how. As one commentator recently
that investigation provided adequate assurance of reliability." McCoRMICK,

supra note 5, § 318, at 894.
139. See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
141. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADriTON-DECInING APPEALS 121-57 (1960); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 4416, at 142, § 4449, at 417; Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial

Method, 97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 698-708 (1984); Flanagan, supra note 118, at 6263.
142. Currie, supra note 8, at 315.
143. See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981);
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
329 (1971); Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 325 (1927); United States

v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924); Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 363-64
(1859).
144. See Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea Have PreclusiveEffect?, 70 IOWA L.
REV. 27, 45 (1984) ("[Ihe doctrine of preclusion is
based on the proposition that a question is foreclosed
'the truth.' ").
145. See Carrington, Adjudication as a Private
LEGAL STuD. 303, 308 (1979); Green, supra note 118,

not, I believe, a doctrine
because we already know
Good A Comment, 8 J.
at 219-24.
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noted, "[w]e value a day in court for reasons not wholly related
to the ascertainment of objective truth-reasons that derive
from our belief in the importance of participation and individual autonomy."'1 46 If the parties participated fully in the prior
proceeding, it does not necessarily enhance reliability, but it
does make binding effect more palatable, at least as against
those parties. 147
This difference in orientation explains the policy barriers
that constitute the key difference between collateral estoppel
and using judgments as evidence. 148 These barriers have come
and gone over time. Today, because many are gone or eroding
quickly,149 the significance of admitting judgments into evidence has diminished. When, however, a policy consideration
extrinsic to reliability still survives to bar collateral estoppel,
admission into evidence remains important because it is the
only way a prior judgment can affect later litigation.150 Fur146. Shapiro, supra note 144, at 45; see also Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of CollateralEstoppel Against Nonparties to Prior
Litigation, 63 B.U.L. REv. 383, 420-22 (1983); Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues: The Failureof Nonparty Preclusionand an Alternative Proposa4
67 IowA L. REV. 917, 923 (1982); Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an
Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1055, 1088-89 (1979); Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity: The Limits of InstrumentalRationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 630-31 (1973); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Trial Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1391-93
(1971); Note, CollateralEstoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1496-97
(1974).
147. Cf.Parkiane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (important factor in determining whether application of collateral estoppel would be
unfair is whether party against whom it is asserted had a "full and fair" opportunity to litigate the issue).
148. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 470, at 893. This
commentary states:
Of course the principal aims of collateral estoppel differ from those of
the hearsay doctrine. The one seeks mainly to prevent unnecessary
relitigation of matters which the party to be estopped already actually
litigated, with fair procedural opportunity to do so; the other seeks
mainly to prevent receipt of unreliable evidence.
Id.; see also id. at 909-10. But cf.Thau, supra note 30, at 1081 ("the concept of
reliability... provides the most accurate explanation of when courts actually
apply collateral estoppel").
149. See infra text accompanying notes 214-295.
150. For example, federal courts hearing Title VII cases continue to admit
federal agency findings into evidence, but deny them collateral estoppel effect,
even after Kremer, which only concerned prior state court findings. See
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 863 n.39 (1976) (administrative findings
regarding federal employees' Title VII claims held admissible but not conclusive); Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576, 577 (7th Cir. 1980)
(EEOC findings); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc'y, 569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.
1978) (EEOC findings); cf McClure v. Mexia Ind. School Dist., 750 F.2d 396,
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thermore, while collateral estoppel and evidence overlap much
more than they used to, policy barriers probably will not disappear completely as long as collateral estoppel and evidence differ fundamentally in purpose and application. Identifying any
remaining policy barriers, and analyzing their significance, is
the key to determining whether prior judgments should be
more liberally admitted into evidence.
III.

EFFECT OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS ON
NONPARTIES

Major policy barriers to collateral estoppel have eroded or
disappeared over the years. As Part I demonstrated, prior findings may now be used as both evidence and collateral estoppel
against a party in four categories where previously they could
only be used as evidence. 151 Yet, barriers to the use of collateral estoppel still remain, even in those four categories. The
most significant barrier is the rule against nonparty preclusion,
which states that collateral estoppel may only be used against
parties to the prior litigation and their privies and may not be
used against a nonparty. 152 Consequently, the only way to use a
prior judgment against a nonparty to the original suit is by admitting it into evidence. For example, several cases involving
prior administrative findings discuss their use as evidence but
never consider collateral estoppel because the parties to the
later litigation had not been parties to the administrative
153
proceeding.
Indeed, administrative proceedings provide a good example
of this approach because the rule against nonparty preclusion
can be especially restrictive in the administrative context. Administrative proceedings are often more investigative than ad399-403 (5th Cir. 1985) (prior EEOC finding admissible into evidence under
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C); harmless error to admit entire EEOC

file); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir. 1977) (admissibility within
trial court's discretion); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir.

1972) (same).
151. See supra notes 11-86 and accompanying text.
152. The discussion of patent validity findings in Part I is an example of
the continued viability of this rule. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying

text.
153. See In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 419-21 (6th Cir. 1982)
(findings in a Coast Guard hearing to revoke a tugboat captain's license);

Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (3d Cir.) (Coast Guard
hearing examiner's finding in connection with a shipboard altercation), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978); Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 534 F. Supp. 509,
511-13 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (National Transportation Safety Board report).
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versarial and may even be so nonadversarial that no one can be
identified as a "party" subject to collateral estoppel.'5 This observation is consistent with courts' general reluctance to accord
collateral estoppel effect to determinations made in administrative rulemaking or legislative activity. 55 Findings from this
sort of administrative proceeding can affect later litigation only
through admission as evidence. 15 6
Cases outside the administrative context also illustrate the
use of a finding as evidence against a nonparty when collateral
estoppel is unavailable. Schwartz v. United States15 7 involved,
among other things, a dispute between Schwartz and the federal government over ownership of corporate stock. To prove
that Schwartz did not own the stock, the government used the
verdict from a prior criminal trial in which Schwartz's associate, Irvin Kovens, had been convicted. 58 The jury in that trial
found that Kovens owned the stock. 159 Schwartz argued that
the finding in Kovens' trial could not estop him from asserting
ownership because he had not been a party to that trial.160
The court agreed, but still admitted the special verdict into evidence against him.1 61 In several similar cases, courts have used

prior criminal convictions as evidence against nonparties in162
stead of giving them collateral estoppel effect.
154. See Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 176, 183-86
(E.D. Pa. 1976); cf.Smith v. Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215, 220-23 (5th Cir. 1980)

(admissibility of a Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Report against
the owner-operators of the vessel on which plaintiff's deceased husband had
been employed).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 12-28.
156. See, e.g., Stasiukevich v. Nicolls, 168 F.2d 474, 479-80 (1st Cir. 1948)
(congressional legislative reports admissible); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325,
330 n.6 (E.D. La. 1983) (records of regularly conducted session of state legislative committees admissible).
157. 582 F. Supp. 224 (D. Md. 1984).
158. Id,at 227-28.
159. Id. at 225.
160. Id. at 227.
161. Id. at 227-28.
162. See, e.g., Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976). Semler involved a wrongful death action against a
psychiatric institute for negligent release of a patient who killed the plaintiff's
daughter. The murder conviction of the former patient was admitted into evidence to prove the murder. Id at 127. The institute, however, was not a party
to the prior criminal conviction. See also Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d
1332, 1346-47 (5th Cir. 1978) (guilty plea of driver not excluded by hearsay rule
but inadmissible because of irrelevance); cf.New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Null, 554 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1977). Null held that a criminal prosecution cannot
bind a nonparty, but did not consider whether it could be admitted into evidence. Id. at 901. One commentary has stated, however, that "any suggestion
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Thus even after the erosion of most of the policies that
once barred collateral estoppel in these four categories, collateral estoppel is still unavailable, and use of a judgment as evidence is still potentially significant, whenever the prior finding
is used against a nonparty to the prior proceeding. Using judgments as evidence against nonparties can supplant collateral estoppel in response to a policy barrier, just as other policy
barriers prompted the use of judgments as evidence in earlier
times. 63 Outside the categories of admissible prior judgments,
however, the use of prior judgments as evidence still runs
counter to the general rule that prior judgments are hearsay
and not admissible. 164
In addition to using prior judgments as evidence, there are
two other closely analogous, and more widely accepted, ways in
which a prior proceeding can affect nonparties in later litigation: through the introduction of testimony from a prior proceeding and through stare decisis. The availability of these
analogues suggests that a general rule admitting prior judgments into evidence against nonparties may be justified.
Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence admits former testimony from a deposition, hearing, or trial in the same
or different proceeding 65 if the witness is unavailable 66 to testify in person. The testimony can be used against a litigant
only if it, or a "predecessor in interest," had an "opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony" in the prior proceeding by direct, cross, or redirect examination. 61 7
Congress did not define the terms "predecessor in interthat the judgment was inadmissible against the defendant in [Null] because

she was not party to the prior criminal proceedings seems incorrect." 4 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 470, at 909.
163. But cf. Note, Judgments, supra note 5, at 409 ("[t]he evidentiary use
of civil judgments in subsequent civil cases is almost entirely precluded by the
doctrine of res judicata").
164. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
165. Rule 804(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides an exception
to the hearsay rule for:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in
the course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding,
a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1).
166. For a definition of "unavailability," see FED. R. EVIn. 804(a).
167. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
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est 'u 68 or "opportunity and similar motive to develop testimony." The original draft of the Rules would have admitted
former testimony against a nonparty, as long as someone with
opportunity and similar motive had participated in the prior
proceeding. 169 The House limited the provision to later civil
cases and added the "predecessor in interest" language.170
Some cases have interpreted the House's modification as imposing an additional requirement that goes beyond "opportunity
and similar motive to develop the testimony" and which
amounts to common-law privity.' 71 If so, former testimony
would be admissible only against persons subject to collateral
estoppel, and thus not against nonparties. 7 2
The majority of cases, however, have held that the House
added no such privity requirement, and that the rule requires
only opportunity and similar motive. 173 This reading may
168. The "predecessor in interest" apparently need not have been a party
to the prior proceeding, as long as it had the opportunity to develop testimony.
See id, This provision applies only to admission of former testimony into evidence in civil cases. Id. Admission in criminal cases raises problems under
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. See McCoRMIcK, supra note
5, § 256, at 766; Martin, The Former Testimony Exception in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 IowA L. REv. 547, 570-93 (1972).
169. The advisory committee draft of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1)
provided a hearsay exception for
[t]estimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a
different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law
in the course of the same or another proceeding, at the instance of or
against a party with an opportunity to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination, with motive and interest similar
to those of the party against whom now offered.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) (advisory committee draft), 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1972).
170. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7088. The House Report stated:
The Committee considered that it is generally unfair to impose upon
the party against whom the hearsay evidence is being offered responsibility for the manner in which the witness was previously handled
by another party. The sole exception to this, in the Committee's view,
is when a party's predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding
had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness.
171. See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 444 F.
Supp. 110, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1978); see also Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580
F.2d 1179, 1190-92 (3d Cir.) (Stern, J., concurring), cert denied, 439 U.S. 969
(1978). Part IV-B discusses common law privity more fully. See infra notes
241-252 and accompanying text.
172. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 487, at 1103-04;
MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 256, at 766.
173. See Clay v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 722 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (6th Cir.
1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 3537 (1984); Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580
F.2d 1179, 1185-87 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978). Lloyd v. Ameri-
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strain the legislative history, but it enjoys the support of leading commentators. 174 One commentator has suggested that the
House wanted a more restrictive approach only in later criminal cases. 175 Indeed, even if the "predecessor in interest" language was added to limit the exception, nothing indicates that it
goes so far as to require privity.176 The Senate's comment that
the difference between the House version and the original draft
can Export Lines is the major case in this area. Lloyd, a seaman, was hurt in
a fight with another crew member, Alvarez. Lloyd sued the ship owner, Export, for negligence and unseaworthiness. Export filed a third-party claim
against Alvarez, who then counterclaimed against Export, also for negligence
and unseaworthiness. The trial court dismissed Lloyd's claim after he failed to
prosecute, leaving only Alvarez's counterclaim against Export. Id. at 1181.
The court refused to admit Lloyd's testimony from an earlier Coast Guard
hearing as evidence against Alvarez. Id. at 1182. The jury found for Alvarez.
I&L at 1181.
The Third Circuit reversed, finding that "there was a sufficient community of interest shared by the Coast Guard in its hearing and Alvarez in the
subsequent civil trial to satisfy Rule 804(b)(1)." Id. at 1185-86. Moreover, the
court felt that "the basic interest advanced by both was that of determining
culpability and, if appropriate, exacting a penalty for the same condemned behavior thought to have occurred." Id. at 1186 (citation omitted). The court
therefore held that a "predecessor in interest" is anyone who had "'a like motive to cross-examine about the same matters as the present party would have,
(and] was accorded an adequate opportunity for such examination."' Id. at
1187 (quoting MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 256, at 619-20).
Other cases, in partial agreement with Lloyd, hold that similar motive is
enough when the "predecessor in interest" is the government, but seem to
adopt a presumption against admission when a private litigant is involved. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1254-55
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (interpreting Lloyd as a government litigant case, even though
Lloyd did not, and did not need to, reason in those terms), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust LItig., 723 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); cf. In re Master Key Antitrust
Litig., 72 F.R.D. 108, 109 (D. Conn.) (noting the "unique relationship between
the Government's antitrust enforcement suits and the private actions which
follow" and admissibility of the judgment under Clayton Act § 5(a)), affd
mem, 551 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1976).
174. See McCoRMIK, supra note 5, § 257, at 766-67 ("Had it been intended
to reinstate the outmoded concept of privity as developed at the common law,
a statement to that effect could easily have been included, with unmistakeable
[sic] meaning, but no such statement was made."); see also 4 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 15, § 487, at 1103-11.
175. See MCCORMICK, supra note 5, § 257, at 766.
176. See Lloyd, 580 F.2d at 1185; In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 72
F.R.D. 108, 109 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem, 551 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1976). In isolated
cases, opportunity and motive may be harder to establish than common-law
privity. For example, even against parties and privies in an earlier proceeding,
the rule does not admit former testimony unless they had "opportunity and
similar motive." See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 487, at
1105 n.11.
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"is not great"'177 has provided additional support for this
78

view.1

A less restrictive interpretation of the "predecessor in interest" and "opportunity and similar motive" language in Rule
804(b)(1) is consistent with the steady broadening of the former
testimony exception at common law.179 Although earlier cases
had insisted on strict identity of issues between proceedings,
more recent cases have required only "substantial identity" of
issues and excluded former testimony only where the differences resulted in a lack of opportunity or similar motive to develop testimony. 18 0 Courts also once imposed a type of
mutuality that forbade nonparties to the prior proceeding to
use any former testimony in subsequent litigation.' 8 ' Well
before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however,
courts stopped insisting on identical parties and instead allowed
nonparties to introduce former testimony against other nonparmoties if someone had been given the opportunity and similar
182
tive to develop the testimony in the prior proceeding.
Past and present practices under the former testimony ex177. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1974 U.S.

CODE

CONG. & AD.NEws 7051, 7074.

178. See Lloyd, 580 F.2d at 1185 (citing S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 28 (1974)); Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1253 (same).
179. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 487, at 1082, 1110;
McCoRMICK, supra note 5, § 256, at 763-66, § 257, at 767-68; 4 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra note 4, %804(b)(1)[04]; Falknor, Former Testimony and the
Uniform Rules: A Commen4 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651, 652-53, 653-55 (1963);
Martin, supra note 168, at 555-57.
180. Pre-Rules cases include: Jefferson Amusement Co. v. Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 409 F.2d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 1969); First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, 22 F.R.D. 46, 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Wolf v. United Air Lines, 12 F.R.D. 1, 34 (M.D. Pa. 1951). For a similar case under the Federal Rules, see Zenith, 505
F. Supp. at 1252 n.78.
181. See Metropolitan St. Ry. v. Gumby, 99 F. 192, 197-99 (2d Cir. 1900);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 F.R.D. 48, 48-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1938);
McInturff v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 248 Ill.92, 95-98, 93 N.E. 369, 370-71
(1910); Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Wise, 114 Okla. 254, 257-58, 246 P. 595, 597-98
(1926).
182. See Insl-Wool Insulation Corp. v. Home Insulation, Inc., 176 F.2d 502,
503-04 (10th Cir. 1949); Hertz v. Graham, 23 F.R.D. 17, 20-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1958),
cer, denied, 368 U.S. 929 (1961); Rivera v. American Export Lines, 13 F.R.D.
27, 28-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Mid-City Bank & Trust Co. v. Reading Co., 3 F.R.D.
320, 322-24 (D.N.J. 1944); North River Ins. Co. v. Walker, 161 Ky. 368, 369-71,
170 S.W.2d 983, 984 (1914); School Dist. of Pontiac v. Sachse, 274 Mich. 345, 34950, 264 N.W. 396, 397 (1936); Harrell v. Quincy, 0., & K.C.R.R., 186 S.W. 677,
679 (Mo. 1916). Wigmore was an early advocate of this trend. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1388, at 103 (3d ed. 1940); see also 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGE , supra note 4, 804(b)(1)[04].
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ception are consistent with earlier conclusions about the similarities and differences between using judgments as evidence
and collateral estoppel. Former testimony, like a prior finding,
is admissible into evidence if it is reliable. Cross-examination
by someone with opportunity and similar motive is one way to
establish reliability. 8 3 This reliability is sufficient to justify admission against a nonparty, especially since the nonparty has a
84
chance to offer rebuttal evidence at the subsequent trial.'
Rules that would bar collateral estoppel, such as the rule
against nonparty preclusion, should not be applied to former
testimony because such rules reflect policies that go beyond the
basic concern with reliability. 8 5
Stare decisis is another way in which prior litigation can be
used to affect later litigation without the binding effect of collateral estoppel.1' 6 Like collateral estoppel and the use of judgments as evidence, stare decisis helps to maintain consistency
among judgments and respect for the legal system. 8 7 Like former testimony and use of judgments as evidence, stare decisis
can operate against nonparties8 ss and provides an alternative to
collateral estoppel.
183. In Lloyd, for example, former testimony was admissible, even against
a nonparty, Alvarez, because he and the Coast Guard had the same interests
with respect to Lloyd's testimony. See Lloyd, 580 F.2d at 1186.
184. See Lloyd, 580 F.2d at 1184-87; In re Master Key Antitrust Litig., 72
F.R.D. 108, 109 (2d Cir. 1976); In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust
LAtig., 444 F. Supp. 110, 112 (N.D. Cal. 1978); von Moschzisker, supra note 118,
at 300.
185. See McCORMICK, supra note 5, § 257, at 767-68; 5 J. WIGMOBE, supra
note 5, § 1388, at 118-20; Falknor, supra note 179, at 655; Martin, supra note
168, at 555 n.43.
186. Stare decisis is not binding because cases can always be distinguished.
Yet, even without binding effect, stare decisis can determine the outcome of
cases. This is apparent in cases that decide whether an applicant for intervention of right has "an interest relating to the property or transaction which is
the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest."
FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a). Courts thus allow intervention because stare decisis can
bind the nonparty as a practical matter even though collateral estoppel does
not apply. See Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 732 F.2d 261, 265-66 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 78 (1985); Corby Recreation, Inc. v. General
Elec. Co., 581 F.2d 175, 177 (8th Cir. 1978); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (10th
Cir. 1978); Martin v. Travelers Indem. Co., 450 F.2d 542, 554 (5th Cir. 1971);
Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Florida Power Corp. v.
Granlund, 78 F.R.D. 441, 444 (M.D. Fla. 1978); In re Oceana Int'l, Inc., 49
F.R.D. 329, 331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
187. See von Moschzisker, supra note 118, at 300.
188. See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527 (1975).
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In theory, the overlap between stare decisis and collateral
estoppel should be minimal. Collateral estoppel applies to issues of fact, although it may also apply to issues of law on the
same or similar facts.' 8 9 Collateral estoppel applies only
"where the controlling facts and applicable rules remain unchanged,"190 and is inappropriate as to unmixed questions of
law in successive actions involving substantially unrelated
claims. 191 These principles permit flexibility and growth in the
law, recognizing that collateral estoppel should not "freeze doctrine in areas of the law where responsiveness to changing patterns of conduct or social mores is critical."'1 92 Stare decisis, on
the other hand, is the appropriate mechanism for giving effect
to a prior judgment when the issues are legal, abstract, and unrelated to the facts of particular cases. 193 It is not an appropriate mechanism for giving subsequent effect to fact-specific prior
findings, including most jury findings.194
189. United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 104 S. Ct. 575, 578-79 (1984);
United States v. Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568, 571 (1984); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27 & comment c (1982).
190. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 600 (1948); accord Limbach v.
The Hooven & Allison Co., 104 S.Ct. 1837, 1843 (1984); United States v. Stone
& Downer Co., 274 U.S. 225, 236 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(2) (1982) (collateral estoppel does not apply if "[t]he issue is one of
law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or
(b) a new determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws").
191. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236, 242 (1924)); accordAllen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
95 & n.7 (1980); Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1045-50 (2d Cir. 1974);
Chern v. Bank of Am., 15 Cal. 3d 866, 871-72, 544 P.2d 1310, 1313, 127 Cal. Rptr.
110, 113-14 (1976); 18 C. WRGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4425,
at 242-48; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-10

(1942).
192. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979); see also Dracos v.
Hellenic Lines, 705 F.2d 1392, 1397 (4th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 311
(1985); Glictronix Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 603 F. Supp. 552, 571-73
(D.N.J. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 comment b, § 29(7)
& comment i (1982); Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United
States Governmen 70 IOwA L. REV. 113, 125 n.93 (1984).
193. See Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 601 (1948) ("[i]f consistency
in decision is considered just and desirable, a court may rely on stare decisis");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 comment b (1982) ("the more
flexible principle of stare decisis is sufficient to protect the parties and the
court from unnecessary burdens"); id.§ 29 comment i ("the rule of preclusion
should ordinarily be superseded by the less limiting principle of stare decisis");
see also 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4425, at 244;
von Moschzisker, supra note 118, at 300.
194. See Green, supra note 118, at 175 n.199. Several commentators have
likened stare decisis to preclusion of nonparties, see Berch, supra note 8, at
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In actual practice, however, there is a murky area where issues of law appropriate for collateral estoppel and other "unmixed" issues of law appropriate for stare decisis overlap. 95
Within this overlap, both stare decisis and collateral estoppel
are available to give effect to the results of prior litigation. If
the prior finding is being used against a nonparty, however,
only stare decisis will be available because of the rule against
nonparty preclusion.
Several recent asbestosis cases from the Eastern District of
Texas illustrate this practice of using stare decisis as an alternative to collateral estoppel in a nonparty situation. 196 The chief
case is Borel v. FibreboardPaperProducts Corp.,197 in which a
Fifth Circuit panel upheld a jury finding that asbestos is "a defective and unreasonably dangerous product. '198 This ruling established strict tort liability for asbestosis, an eventually fatal
lung condition linked to asbestos exposure. 199
Inevitably, the "defective and unreasonably dangerous" issue reappeared in other victims' suits, such as Mooney v.
Fibreboard Corp.200 Mooney sued all of the Borel defendants
plus one new defendant and tried to incorporate the Borel "de201
fective and unreasonably dangerous" finding into his case.
Judge Joseph Fisher, who had been the trial judge in Borel,
held that the "defective and unreasonably dangerous" finding
did not collaterally estop the new defendant, because merely
531-32; George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral
Class Action, 32 STAN.L. REV. 655, 684-86 (1980), but the latter clearly includes
issues of fact that the former does not. See Schroeder, supra note 146, at 93439; Note, Preclusion of Absent Disputantsto Compel Intervention, 79 COLUtm.
L. REV. 1551, 1560-61 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Absent Disputants].
195. In fact, the Supreme Court declined several recent opportunities to
define "unmixed questions of law," holding only that the concept did not apply
to the facts presented.
An exception which requires a rigid determination of whether an
issue is one of fact, law or mixed fact and law, as a practical matter,
would often be impossible to apply because "the journey from a pure
question of fact to a pure question of law is one of subtle gradations
rather than one marked by a rigid divide."
United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 104 S.Ct. 575, 579 n.4; (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMNTS § 28 comment b (1982)); 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4425, at 63.
196. See infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text. See generally Green,
supra note 118, at 172-78.
197. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
198. id. at 1087-92.
199. See Id. at 1091-92.
200. 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
201. Id-at 244.
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making the same arguments does not establish privity.20 2 He
held, however, that Borel controlled the Mooney case as "stare
decisis" and granted summary
judgment against the new de20 3
fendant on the issue.
Another asbestosis case from the same district reached similar results. In Flatt v. Johns Manville Sales Corp.,20 4 Judge
Robert Parker hesitated to apply collateral estoppel against a
nonparty, but he held that "as a matter of law products containing asbestos are defective and dangerous within the mean'20 5
ing of section 402A of the Restatement [(Second) of Torts].
Although there is some question whether this particular
use of stare decisis is proper, 20 6 scattered cases provide further
examples of stare decisis as an alternative to collateral estoppel.
One case held that certain administrative findings "have no collateral estoppel effect, as distinguished from persuasive
force," 20 7 but added, "[o]f course, interpretations are exceedingly helpful to interested parties and the public as indicative
of the policy and reasoning of the agency, and their persuasive
202. Id. at 249.
203. Id.
204. 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
205. Id. at 841. The Flatt opinion is somewhat unclear. It first seems to
deny collateral estoppel, see id. at 839-40, but after discussing stare decisis, it
says that the nonparty is collaterally estopped. Id. at 840. The Fifth Circuit
later treated the opinion as based on stare decisis. See Migues v. Fibreboard
Corp., 662 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir. 1981); Green, supra note 118, at 174-75
n.199.
206. In Migues, the Fifth Circuit cast considerable doubt on this use of
stare decisis. Migues, 662 F.2d at 1189. Judge Parker, the trial judge in
Migues, had used Borel to establish, even as against nonparties, that "all asbestos products are unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law." Id. at 1183.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, pointing out that Borel had held only that the jury
could have found that asbestos products unaccompanied by adequate warnings
were unreasonably dangerous. See id.at 1189.
The true import of Migues is not clear. The decision may rest on the limited ground that Borel did not decide the issue of law that Judge Parker
thought it had. The opinion's tone, however, suggests a more general skepticism toward the use of stare decisis to prevent relitigation when collateral estoppel is unavailable. The Fifth Circuit showed a similar attitude in reversing
Judge Parker in Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D.
Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). Judge Parker had held that the
new defendant's and the Borel defendants' interests were close enough to
place them in privity with each other. Hardy, 509 F. Supp. at 1361. In the
alternative, he took judicial notice of the relationship between asbestos and
plaintiffs' ailments, relying on Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id.
at 1362-63. The Fifth Circuit in Migues declined, however, to review Judge
Parker's use of judicial notice in Hardy. See Migues, 662 F.2d at 1187 & n.9.
207. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Federal Energy Admin., 556 F.2d 542, 551
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
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20 8
In another
effect may widely transcend any binding force."
case, the defendant relied on an earlier finding from the same
judicial district, but on different facts, that the limitation provision in its standard contract was reasonable. 20 9 The plaintiff, as
a nonparty to the earlier suit, could not be collaterally estopped, but the Ninth Circuit found that it could "properly notice a doctrine or rule of law from such prior case and apply
that principle under the theory of stare decisis. 2 1 0 In a third
case, the First Circuit applied the Rovico rule to a matter not
involving patents. 2 " It held that while an earlier judgment
would not be collateral estoppel against nonparties, "the docresolution of
trine of stare decisis should be invoked to give our
'2
the [same] issue in that case precedential effect." '
It is easy to overstate the significance of these cases given
the major differences between stare decisis and collateral estoppel. Yet as long as issues arise in the murky area between
questions of law appropriate for collateral estoppel and other
"unmixed" questions of law appropriate for stare decisis, courts
will continue to view stare decisis as one means of using a prior
judgment against a nonparty when collateral estoppel is
213
unavailable.

IV.

NONPARTIES AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

The most prominent remaining barrier to collateral estoppel is the barrier that shields nonparties. Prior findings as evidence, former testimony, and stare decisis all have the greatest
208. Id.; see also Cinema Assocs. v. City of Oakwood, 417 F. Supp. 146, 150
(S.D. Ohio 1976) (previous determination that a film is not obscene precludes
relitigation of obscenity in judicial district in which prior determination was

rendered).
209. M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483,
1491 (9th Cir. 1983).
210. Id (citing 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 58, at 92 (1967)). The court re-

jected the defendant's argument that it should judicially notice the earlier
finding. Id
211. United States v. 177.51 Acres of Land, 716 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1983).

212. Id at 81.
213. Some courts will issue confusing opinions that waver between collateral estoppel and stare decisis. See Flatt, 488 F. Supp. at 841. Courts also may

consider judicial notice and law of the case, but these two doctrines are much
less significant because of their inherent limits. Judicial notice applies only to

uncontroverted facts. See FED. R. EvID. 201. Law of the case applies only to
findings in the same case. See Greiner v. Wilke (In re Staff Mortgage & Inv.
Corp.), 625 F.2d 281, 283 (9th Cir. 1980); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 1, § 4478; Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion,
1967 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1.
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practical significance when they allow subsequent effect in
spite of this barrier. In this regard, all three further undermine
the belief that prior proceedings affect later litigation through
collateral estoppel or not at all.
Recently, however, the rule against nonparty preclusion
has been weakening, and collateral estoppel doctrine has crept
slowly toward binding nonparties by narrowly casting the issue
as collateral estoppel vel non.21 4 This development has generated a great deal of commentary among scholars, who tend to
view the issue in all-or-nothing terms: either the prior finding
binds the nonparty, or it has no effect at all on the subsequent
litigation.2 1 5 Both sides to the nonparty preclusion debate have
framed the issue too narrowly, however, because neither considers the third alternative: using prior judgments as evidence,
rather than collateral estoppel, against nonparties.
A.

THE DEMISE OF MUTUALITY

The nonparty preclusion debate is best understood as part
of a larger debate that has occupied collateral estoppel doctrine
for most of this century-whom can a prior finding benefit and
whom can it bind? The trend for the past several decades has
been for courts to broaden the group of litigants who can benefit from collateral estoppel.2 1 6 They have done so by gradually
abandoning the mutuality requirement, under which no litigant
could use a favorable prior finding as collateral estoppel unless
that prior finding, if adverse, would have bound the same litigant.21 7 In effect, mutuality meant that a prior finding would
be binding only if both the party benefitted and the party to be
2 18
bound were parties to the prior proceeding.
214. See infra notes 241-278 and accompanying text.
215. 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4416, at 144
(footnotes omitted) (citing Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d

1338, 1349-51 (3d Cir. 1975)).
216. See United States v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-26 (E.D.

Wash. & D. Nev. 1962), aff'd in part and modified in part sub nom. United
Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert dismissed, 379 U.S. 951
(1964); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4403, at 21;
Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 855

(1952).
217. See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S.
111, 127 (1912); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, supra note 1, § 4463, at
559-61.
218. The first Restatement of Judgments included a mutuality requirement.
See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 & comment d (1942). Many commentators of the period supported mutuality. See Seavey, Res Judicata with Refer-
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Most commentators trace the abandonment of mutuality to
Justice Roger Traynor's opinion for the California Supreme
Court in Bernhardv. Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association.21 9 According to the Bernhard court, collateral estoppel applied if the party to be estopped had litigated
and lost the same issue once before, regardless of who the first
adversary was. 22 0 Over the past forty years, federal courts and
most state courts have adopted this general view,221 although
mutuality may still be required in certain situations. For example, nonmutual collateral estoppel may not be allowed if there
is reason to doubt the accuracy of the prior finding. Prior outcomes may be inconsistent,222 or procedural differences between the two proceedings may make it likely that the issue
will be decided differently.22 Similarly, the prior finding may
reflect different tactical relationships among the parties, jury
compromise, 2 4 or lack of incentive in the first action to litigate
or appeal. 225
ence to Persons Neither Partiesnor Privies-Two California Cases, 57 HARV.
L. REV. 98, 105 (1943); von Moschzisker, supra note 118, at 302-03.
219. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). For earlier criticism, see 7 WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 6, at 171.

220. Bernhard,19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
221. Professor Robert Casad counted only nine states that have followed
the mutuality rule recently: Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, and North Dakota. See Casad, Intersystem Issue Preclusionand The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 510, 511 n.1 (1981); see also Fisher v. Space of Pensacola, Inc.,
461 So. 2d 790, 792 (Ala. 1984) (declining to abandon privity and mutuality requirements). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 1, § 4464, at 470-80 (covering abandonment of the mutuality
requirement).
222. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979); Setter v. A.H. Robins Co., 748 F.2d 1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1984); Brumley Estate v.
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied,
465 U.S. 1028 (1984); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Century Home Components, Inc., 275 Or. 97, 110, 550 P.2d 1185, 1191-92 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(4) & comment f (1982).
223. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 339 n.15; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(2) & comment d (1982); see also Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking
Co., 546 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1977) (defendant in prior action could not testify because of state's dead man statute); cf. Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing
Corp., 747 F.2d 689, 693-94 (11th Cir. 1984) (different burden of persuasion);
Hollenbeck v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 605 F. Supp. 421, 434 (E.D. Mo. 1984)
(different procedural and evidentiary opportunities), affd, 780 F.2d 20 (8th
Cir. 1985).
224. See Taylor v. Hawkinson, 47 Cal. 2d 893, 896, 306 P.2d 797, 799 (1957);
Lundeen v. Hackbarth, 285 Minn. 7, 9, 171 N.W.2d 87, 88 (1969); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29(5) & comment g (1982).
225. See Parklane,439 U.S. at 330 (citing Berner v. British Commonwealth
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Courts often distinguish between "defensive" and "offensive" nonmutual collateral estoppel. Defensive use occurs
when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a
claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another adversary.2 2 6 This type of nonmutual use was approved
by the California Supreme Court in Bernhard, and in 1971 by
the United States Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laborato2 2 7 Courts tend
ries, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.
to look favorably on the defensive use of collateral estoppel because it encourages plaintiffs to consolidate claims against multiple defendants into one lawsuit.22 8 Offensive use of collateral
estoppel occurs "when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously
229
litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party."
Courts tend to disfavor offensive use because of its potential for
tactical manipulation by a plaintiff who stands aside and awaits
the outcome of similar litigation by other plaintiffs.2 0
Professor Brainerd Currie's "multiple claimant anomaly" is
the classic illustration of a problem inherent in the offensive
use of collateral estoppel.2 31 In his hypothetical, a railroad accident leaves the railroad facing separate suits by each of fifty injured passengers. If the railroad wins on liability in one case, it
cannot collaterally estop the other passengers who sue later because they are nonparties. But if the railroad loses, it can be
collaterally estopped by other plaintiffs who rely on their fel2
low passenger's victory.23 2 The results are multiple lawsuits 33
Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 540-41 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983
(1966); Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
720 (1944)); De la Fuente v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 713 F.2d 225, 234 (7th
Cir. 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5) & comments g, i, j
(1982).
226. See Parklane,439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
227. 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971).
228. See Parklane,439 U.S. at 329-31; see also Note, Defensive and Offensive Assertion, supra note 8, at 1019-32 (summarizing types of cases in which
defensive use of collateral estoppel is beneficial).
229. Parklane,439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
230. See infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
231. See Currie, supra note 8, at 285-89.
232. Id. at 287-89. George, supra note 194, at 665-66, calls it "free riding."
Note, Absent Disputants,supra note 194, at 1554, calls it "collateral estoppel
roulette."
233. See Semmel, CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality and Joinderof Parties,68
COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1466, 1480 (1968) (noting that encouraging multiple lawsuits contradicts the general approach of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly Rules 13(a), 19, and 23, which is to encourage joinder of nonparties).
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and an advantage to the "wait and see" plaintiff,2 4 who benefits from an arguably unfair shift of litigation risks to the com2
mon defendant. 35
Courts have developed flexible guidelines to control such
manipulation, and trial judges have broad discretion in this
area.2 36 In many cases, for example, courts will not permit nonmutual collateral estoppel if the person seeking to assert it
could have joined the earlier action but did not.237 Many com-

mentators, however, still have serious doubts about the wisdom
of abandoning mutuality in general,2 38 and the use of offensive
2 39
nonmutual collateral estoppel in particular.
Although the scholarly debate continues, it is doubtful that
courts will return to a general mutuality requirement to correct
the one-sidedness that offensive collateral estoppel is believed
to produce. An alternative way of approaching the problem
would be to continue to expand collateral estoppel and allow
the collateral estoppel of nonparties.2 4 0 This would allow a
common defendant to use a judgment against later plaintiffs
who, after the demise of mutuality, may use a judgment against
the common defendant. The multiple claimant anomaly would
disappear and mutuality, albeit of a different sort, would be
restored.
234. See Parklane,439 U.S. at 330.

235. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. M=LLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4464, at
583-84; Note, A ProbabilisticAnalysis of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel 76 MICH. L. REv. 612, 640-61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note,
ProbabilisticAnalysis].
236. Parklane,439 U.S. at 331; Ray v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 758 F.2d
1148, 1150 (7th Cir. 1985).
237. See Parklane,439 U.S. at 331; Hauser v. Krupp Steel Producers, Inc.,
761 F.2d 204, 207 (5th Cir. 1985); Charles J. Arndt, Inc. v. City of Birmingham,
748 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir. 1984); Jack Faucett Assocs. v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., 566 F. Supp. 296, 299 n.4 (D.D.C. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 744
F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 980 (1985); cf. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944, 955-56 (2d Cir.) (Bernhard
applied in favor of plaintiffs not parties to nor in privity with the plaintiffs in
the prior judgment), cert denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
238. See, e.g., Greenebaum, In Defense of the Doctrine of Mutuality of Estoppel, 45 IND. L.J. 1, 9-19 (1969); Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35 TUL. L. REV. 301, 301-11 (1961); Note, Probabilistic
Analysis, supra note 235, at 634-64.
239. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 118, at 52 (offensive collateral estoppel
is not efficient); Flanagan, The Efficiency Hypothesis and Offensive Collateral
Estoppe: A Response to Professor Callen, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J. 835, 836 (similar).
240. See generally Berch, supra note 8, at 529-31 (arguing that binding
nonparty may be consistent with due process); Schroeder, supra note 146, at
922 (nonparty preclusion goes "too far" and ignores party control of
litigation).
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B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NONPARTY PRECLUSION
The rule against nonparty preclusion permits collateral estoppel to be used only against parties and those in privity with
them.2 1 A typical definition of a person in "privity" is one
"who claims an interest in the subject-matter affected by the
judgment through or under one of the parties, i.e., either by inheritance, succession or purchase; and this interest must have
been acquired after rendition of the judgment. ''
Some recent
decisions, however, have stretched traditional doctrine and allowed collateral estoppel to be used against nonparties in some
situations. 24 3 These decisions do not fall readily into neat categories, but rough groupings are possible.
Some cases work with the "privity" concept but allow collateral estoppel when traditional "privity" probably would not.
These cases do not define privity precisely.24 For example, one
court stated that "certain individuals may be so closely related,
their interests so closely interwoven, or their rights so similar
that it is unfair to treat them separately. '245 These cases find
privity based on a variety of significant relationships independent of litigation. Several have found privity between husband
241. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402

U.S. 313, 320 (1971); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MIZLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1,
§ 4448, at 408.
242. Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35
YALE L.J. 607, 608-09 (1926) (emphasis omitted); see Bigelow v. Old Dominion
Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1912) ("privity denotes
mutual or successive relationship to same right of property"); Ethnic Employees of the Library of Congress v. Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(applying this definition of privity); Gill Duffus Servs., Inc. v. Islam, 679 F.2d
404, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 43

(1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4449, at 418
n.22.
243. See infra notes 245-272 and accompanying text.
244. See First Alabama Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v. Parsons Steel, Inc.,
747 F.2d 1367, 1378 (11th Cir. 1984) ("A finding of privity is no more than a
finding that all of the facts and circumstances justify a conclusion that nonparty preclusion is proper."), rev'd on other grounds,106 S. Ct. 768 (1986); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975) (interests of parties
so closely aligned that party in first action is the "virtual representative" of
party in second action); Lynch v. Glass, 44 Cal. App. 3d 943, 497, 119 Cal. Rptr.
139, 142 (1975) (the question is "whether a nonparty was 'sufficiently close'"
so as to "justify the application of collateral estoppel"). The Restatement (Second) of Judgments has abandoned the term privity and instead identifies
types of nonparties who may be bound. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS introduction, at 13-14 (1982), with RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

§ 83 & comment a (1942).
245. Green v. American Broadcasting Co., 572 F.2d 628, 631 (8th Cir. 1978)
(quoting opinion of trial court).
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and wife, 246 and between a decedent's parents and the administrator of his estate.2 7 Other cases define "privity" to cover certain corporate,24 partnership, 249 and associational2 0 ties as well
as contractual relationships.251 Still others include, in some situations, 2 the relationship between government and private
citizen.
246. See Cotton v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 676 F.2d 1368, 1370-71
(11th Cir.) (state court ordered foreclosure on security deed signed only by
wife held to bar action by husband challenging foreclosure), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1041 (1982); Seamon v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa, 576 F. Supp. 1458, 1461 (W.D.
Pa. 1983), affd mem, 740 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1984); Nemeth v. Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 405, 407, 304 P.2d 129, 130-31 (1956). Under
the traditional rule, no privity arises from marriage. See Comment, Nonparties and Preclusionby Judgment The PrivityRule Reconsidered,56 CALIF. L.
REV. 1098, 1115-18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Privity Rule]. See
generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4459 (family
relationships generally).
247. See Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1134-35 (8th Cir. 1975) (court
speaks of functional privity between decedent's parents and administrator).
248. See Green v. American Broadcasting Co., 572 F.2d 628, 630-32 (8th Cir.
1978) (suit involving corporation binds shareholders). But see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 59 (1982) (judgment against corporation not preclusive against officers, shareholders, etc.).
249. See United States v. Geophysical Corp. of Alaska, 732 F.2d 693, 697-98
(9th Cir. 1984) (suit involving general partner binds limited partners and partnership). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 60 (1982)
(binding effect of judgment in action by an injured person against a partner is
dependent upon whether judgment is against or in favor of the injured
person).
250. See Utah Power & Light Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 764
F.2d 865, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Western Coal Traffic League v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 735 F.2d 1408, 1411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984); General Foods Corp. v.
Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Health, 648 F.2d 784, 787-90 (1st Cir. 1981); Crane
v. Commissioner of Dep't of Agriculture, Food & Rural Resources, 602 F.
Supp. 280, 285-88 (D. Me. 1985); Grossman v. Axelrod, 466 F. Supp. 770, 774-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 646 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (1982) (preclusive effect of judgment against an
unincorporated association is dependent upon whether or not the association is
treated as a separate entity under local law).
251. See Mother's Restaurant, Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566,
1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (suit involving service mark licensee binds licensor);
Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227, 1233-34 (2d Cir.) (suit involving
union committee binds members pursuant to master agreement establishing
committee), cert denied, 434 U.S. 903 (1977); American Home Assurance Co.
v. Evans, 589 F. Supp. 1276, 1283-88 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (suit involving insured
binds insurer); Hudson v. Western Oil Fields, Inc., 150 Colo. 456, 459-60, 374
P.2d 403, 405 (1962) (suit involving contract assignor binds assignee); Lingott v.
Biblmire, 24 Wis. 2d 182, 188-89, 128 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1964) (suit involving
mortgagor binds mortgagee). See generally 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 1, § 4460 (section on various types of commercial and contractual relationships).
252. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-46 (1983); Heckman v.
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A second group of cases goes beyond "privity" to apply collateral estoppel to a nonparty who "participated" in a prior proceeding, perhaps as strategist or financier. In Montana v.
United States,25 3 the United States Supreme Court held the
federal government bound by findings in an earlier suit that it
had required to be filed, and in which it had reviewed and approved the complaint, paid attorneys' fees, appeared as amicus
curiae, and directed strategy on appeal. 2- The Court pointed
out that nonparties who "[had] a direct financial or proprietary
interest" in earlier litigation may be bound by the results of
that litigation. 5 5 "[A]lthough not a party, the United States
plainly had a sufficient 'laboring oar' in the conduct of the
256
state-court litigation to actuate principles of estoppel."
A related type of "participation" case bases nonparty preclusion on implied consent to be bound. In Boyd v. Jamaica
Plain Co-operative Bank,257 the Boyds challenged a requirement that they prepay property taxes into escrow without receiving interest from their mortgagee. The court held the
Boyds bound by their earlier acquiescence in a decision that another plaintiff's parallel complaint would be "designated as the
United States, 224 U.S. 413, 445-46 (1912); Hickman v. Electronic Keyboarding,
Inc., 741 F.2d 230, 233-34 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Superior Oil Co. v. City of
Port Arthur, 726 F.2d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1984) (judgment in favor of state,
county, or municipal corporation affecting the public interest is binding on all
citizens and taxpayers); Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d 946, 951
(10th Cir. 1952) (similar); United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301, 130408 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (similar); Battle v. Cherry, 339 F. Supp. 186, 192 (N.D. Ga.
1972) (similar); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41 (1982); 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4458, at 512-22.

253. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
254. Id. at 155.
255.

Id. at 154 (citing Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475,

486-87 (1910)).
256.

Id. at 155 (quoting Drummond v. United States, 324 U.S. 316, 318

(1945)); see also In re Teltronics Servs., 762 F.2d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 1984) (party
in second action was successor by merger to party in first action); Safir v. Dole,
718 F.2d 475, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs had intervened in prior proceeding
and thus were collaterally estopped from relitigating issues raised in prior proceeding), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2389 (1984); Council Bros., Inc. v. Ray Burner
Co., 473 F.2d 400, 404-05 (5th Cir. 1973); Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. United
States, 594 F. Supp. 997, 1003 (D.D.C. 1984), affd in part and rev'd in par
765 F.2d 158 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Ashley v. Watt, 549 F. Supp. 1044, 1048-49 (E.D.
Wis. 1982); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507, 516-18 (S.D. Fla. 1978), affd on other grounds sub
nom. Florida v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d 1340 (5th Cir. 1980), affd in
part and rev'd in part 458 U.S. 670 (1982). For a more thorough treatment of
this question, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 39, 84 (1982); 18
C. WRGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4451, at 427-39.
257. 7 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 386 N.E.2d 775 (1979).
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pilot case for trial purposes." 2 s
Many courts have rejected the expanded privity and participation approaches to preclusion.25 9 Even where courts have
adopted them, these approaches are still arguably consistent
with traditional doctrine and thus unlikely to foster a radical
change in collateral estoppel doctrine. The first works within
the "privity" concept, and the second works through the
"party/privity" rule to include participants as "parties."
The most radical departure from the rule against nonparty
preclusion is found in a third group of "virtual representation"
cases. 260 These cases hold that a nonparty is bound if a party
who had the same interests litigated the prior case, even
though the nonparty was neither a participant nor in privity
261
with a party in the prior proceeding.
The seminal case is Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew. 262 Aerojet had an option to buy land that it leased from two Florida
state agencies. The state enacted a law prohibiting one of the
agencies from selling land to private buyers without first offering it to the county in which it was located. Aerojet tried to ex-3
26
ercise the option, but the state agencies refused to sell.
Aerojet successfully sued to obtain specific performance from
the state agencies, which did not argue that the option was
voided by the statute.2 64 Dade County, where the land was lo258. Boyd, 7 Mass. App. Ct. at 158-59, 386 N.E.2d at 777-79; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 40 (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4453, at 453.
259. See TRW, Inc. v. Ellipse Corp., 495 F.2d 314, 317-18 (7th Cir. 1974);
Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1973), revg In re Air Crash
Disaster, Dayton, Ohio, on March 9, 1967, 350 F. Supp. 757, 766 (S.D. Ohio
1972), cert denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 471 F. Supp. 754, 757 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
260. This term originally referred to a much narrower doctrine under
which a proceeding settling an estate was said to bind unborn heirs, for whom
the parties were "virtual representatives." See In re Estate of Lange, 75 N.J.
464, 477-80, 482-87, 383 A.2d 1130, 1136-38, 1139-41 (1978); 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4457, at 494-95; Roberts, Virtual Representationin Actions Affecting FutureInterests, 30 ILL. L. REv. 580, 581 (1936);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 87 comment a (1982).
261. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 62 comment a (1982).
For a more complete compendium of cases, see 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 1, § 4457.
262. 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975).
263. Id, at 713-15.
264. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Kirk, 318 F. Supp. 55, 65-66 (N.D. Fla. 1970),
affid sub non Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1971), cert
denied, 409 U.S. 892 (1972).
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cated, then sued to buy the land as provided by statute. 265 Aerojet sued to enjoin Dade County's suit, arguing that it was
266
barred by the first suit.

The district court agreed with Aerojet.267 In affirming, the
Fifth Circuit stated that under federal law "a person may be
bound by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be
his virtual representative. '2 68 The first suit bound Dade
County because both it and the state had been interested primarily in blocking Aerojet's purchase.
Other cases follow the Aerojet approach. 26 9 For example, a
Missouri federal district court held that truckers challenging
government regulations were bound by findings in a similar
suit by approximately sixty other carriers represented by the
same counsel.2 70 A Mississippi federal district court held that
an earlier unsuccessful challenge by environmental groups to a
navigation project bound nonparty challengers "having the
same interest." 271 At least one court has held that a party who
2
could intervene but fails to try to do so should be bound.
265.

Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 366 F. Supp. 901, 905 (N.D. Fla. 1973),

affd, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975).
266. Id
267. I& at 908-11.
268. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d at 719; see also Cauefield v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 378 F.2d 876, 878-79 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1009
(1967); Friedenthal v. Williams, 271 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967), affd sub
nom Friedenthal v. General Ins. Co., 395 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1968).
269. These cases treat merger and bar and collateral estoppel cases interchangeably. See Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1979), cert
denied, 445 U.S. 952 (1980); Makariw v. Rinard, 336 F.2d 333, 334 (3d Cir.
1964); Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 501 F. Supp. 742, 749-50
(N.D. Miss. 1980); In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 471 F. Supp. 754,
756-60 (S.D. Fla. 1979); Century 21 Preferred Properties, Inc. v. Alabama Real
Estate Comm'n, 401 So. 2d 764, 770 (Ala. 1981); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34 comment a (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.

supra note 1, § 4406, at 44.
270. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Byers Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 547, 554-56
(W.D. Mo. 1973). The earlier suit is Admiral-Merchants Motor Freight v.
United States, 321 F. Supp. 353 (D. Colo.), affd mem., 404 U.S. 802 (1971). See
also Katz v. Blum, 460 F. Supp. 1222, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd mem, 603
F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 483
(N.D. Tex. 1975).
271. Environmental Defense Fund v. Alexander, 501 F. Supp. 742, 749
(N.D. Miss. 1980); see also Waitkus v. Pomeroy, 31 Colo.App. 396, 406, 506 P.2d
392, 398 (1972) ("the doctrine of collateral estoppel ... is applicable in a situation where, although the parties were not identical, their interests were identical"), rev'd on other grounds,183 Colo. 344, 417 P.2d 396 (1973).
272. See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 459 F. Supp. 507, 514-16 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (citing Aerojet-Gen. Corp.
COOPER,
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Placing a case into one of these three groupings is difficult
at best. Many cases could fit several.2 7 3 Of the three, the virtual representation approach has met with the most resistance
in both case law274 and commentary. 275 Unfortunately, it is
often unclear whether courts are rejecting the doctrine, limiting it, or just not applying it to the facts of the specific case.27 6
v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719-20 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975)), affd
in part on other grounds sub nom. Florida v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 621 F.2d
1340 (5th Cir. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in part, 458 U.S. 670 (1982); see
also Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 114
(1968); Cummins Diesel Mach., Inc. v. Falcon, 305 F.2d 721, 723 (7th Cir. 1962);
18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4452, at 449-53.
273. For example, in Boyd, the court discussed facts showing participation,
but its holding spoke of privity and virtual representation. Boyd, 7 Mass. App.
Ct. at 157-59, 386 N.E.2d at 778-79. Procter & Gamble v. Byers Transp. Co.,
355 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Mo. 1973), is based primarily on the "joint interests"
theory but it also reasons in "privity" terms. Id. at 557. Another case adopts
virtual representation but subsumes it under "privity." See United States v.
Texas, 430 F. Supp. 920, 924 (S.D. Tex. 1977); see also Donovan v. Estate of
Fitzsimmons, 778 F.2d 298, 301-05 (7th Cir. 1985).
274. Even the Fifth Circuit, the source of many virtual representation
cases, has limited the doctrine. In Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, 546 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 343 U.S. 932 (1977), a Fifth Circuit
panel found preclusion but declined to base it on "virtual representation" generally. Id at 97-98. Instead, Judge J. Minor Wisdom focused on the particular
relationship between the government agency that had brought the first suit
and the later private litigants. He reasoned that the relationship was "close
enough to preclude relitigation." Id. at 98. They had the same interests, and
the government parties had provided "adequate representation" in the prior
proceeding. Id. at 100; see also United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d
996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1980).
Another Fifth Circuit case, Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.
1978), limits Aerojet in more general fashion, by restating virtual representation doctrine much more narrowly than set forth in Aerojet. According to Pollard, virtual preclusion requires an "express or implied legal relationship in
which parties to the first suit are accountable to non-parties who file a subsequent suit raising identical issues." Id. at 1008. An "abstract interest" in the
outcome of a controversy is not enough. Id. at 1009. Accord Hardy v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir. 1982) (viewing Aerojet as
resting on the closely aligned interests of two governmental entities); see also
American Postal Workers Union, Columbus Area Local v. United States Postal Serv., 736 F.2d 317, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1984); Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 718 F.2d 533, 542-43 (2d Cir.
1983); Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377, 1379-80 (11th Cir. 1982) (following Pollardinstead of Aerojet), cert denied, 461 U.S. 905 (1983); General Foods
Corp. v. Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Health, 648 F.2d 784, 790 (1st Cir. 1981)
(declining to follow Pollard if it would bind subsidiary through judgment
against parent corporation).
275. See Schroeder, supra note 146, at 923-28; Note, CollateralEstoppel of
Nonparties,supra note 146, at 1490-92.
276. For example, in Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978), McCormick, a candidate in a close election, had sued successfully to overturn an elec-
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Yet, even where a court finds that virtual representation,
standing alone, is insufficient grounds for nonparty preclusion,
that court will generally treat virtual representation as an important factor to be considered. 27 7 Thus, the development of
these three approaches, individually and collectively, reflects
significant pressure for the expansion of collateral estoppel to
allow nonparty preclusion.2 7 8 This pressure has been strong in
recent years and is likely to continue.
C.

JUDGMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN LIEU OF
NONPARTY PRECLUSION

Some commentators welcome this expansion of collateral
estoppel to allow the preclusion of nonparties. One criticized
the Restatement (Second) of Judgments for omitting general
language that would facilitate the further growth of nonparty
preclusion, 27 9 while others would bind nonparties by using the
tion that Griffin had appeared to win on absentee ballots. Id.at 1068. When a
class of absentee voters later challenged McCormick's victory, the First Circuit rejected McCormick's argument that the absentees were bound by the litigation with Griffin. "Mere similarity of interests and a quantum of
representation in the earlier suit does not suffice to bar a nonparty." Id. at
1071. The court held that Griffin and the voters had "parallel... [but] not
necessarily identical" interests. Id at 1072. See also McKinney v. Alabama,
424 U.S. 669, 673-77 (1976) (criminal conviction could not rest on finding in
prior civil proceeding in which defendant was a nonparty); Freeman v. Lester
Coggins Trucking, Inc., 771 F.2d 860, 862-66 (5th Cir. 1985) (nonparty preclusion requires more than a showing of parallel interests or use of the same attorney; Pollard followed); Ethnic Employees of the Library of Congress v.
Boorstin, 751 F.2d 1405, 1409-11 & n.8 (1985) (seemingly requiring actual representation of union members although footnote indicates virtual representation
would suffice); Delta Air Lines v. McCoy Restaurants, Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 587
(11th Cir. 1983); Humphreys v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 670-71 (6th Cir. 1973);
Spiker v. Capitol Milk Producers Coop., 577 F. Supp. 416, 419 (W.D. Va. 1983);
Webb v. Distefano, 575 F. Supp. 639, 644-45 (D. Neb. 1983), aff'd in part on
other grounds and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Webb v. Arresting Officers, 749 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1984); O-F-L- v. M-R-R-, 518
S.W.2d 113, 119-21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); Vincent v. Peter Pan Bakers, Inc., 182
Neb. 206, 208, 153 N.W.2d 849, 850 (1967).
277. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 4457, at
495-99. "All of the cases that in fact preclude relitigation by a nonparty [by
virtual representation] have involved several factors in addition to apparently
adequate litigation by a party holding parallel interests." 1d. § 4457, at 495.
278. See id.§ 4403, at 21 (stating that "there has been a ... tendency to
include more nonparties within the binding effect of unfavorable prior
judgments").
279. Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of Judgments. A Modest Dissent 66
CORNELL L. REV. 464, 466, 498 (1981).
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28
rules of mandatory joinder 2 0 and compulsory intervention. 1
Some commentators, however, view the development of nonparty preclusion with skepticism2 8 2 or alarm.3
The debate thus far has centered on procedural due process, with both sides attempting to ascertain the minimum
amount of individual control and participation necessary to satisfy constitutional requirements. 28 4 By limiting discussion to
the requirements of procedural due process, however, both
sides in the debate have framed the issue too narrowly. Collateral estoppel is just one of several ways in which a prior finding
can affect later litigation. Even assuming nonparty preclusion
is constitutionally permissible, there may be persuasive policy
reasons for refusing to permit it.
Earlier discussion has demonstrated that the major difference between collateral estoppel and using judgments as evidence is that admission into evidence is less severe and depends

280. See McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 707, 724-28 (1976).
281. See Berch, supra note 8, at 533; Note, Absent Disputants,supra note
194, at 1562-76; Comment, Privity Rule, supra note 246, at 1122-32; Comment,
MandatoryIntervention: Expansion of CollateralEstoppel in Favor of Single
DefendantsAgainst Multiple Plaintiffs in Federal Civil Litigation, 14 J. MAR.
L. REV. 441, 459-64 (1981).
282. See 18 C. WmiGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER supra note 1, § 4457, at
500-02.
283. See Comment, The Expanding Scope of the Res JudicataBar, 54 TEX.
L. REV. 527, 528 (1976).
284. Although the issue is by no means settled, a reasonable argument can
be made that nonparty preclusion passes constitutional muster. See George,
supra note 194, at 661-62; Vestal, Res JudicataPreclusion:Expansion, 47 S.
CAL. L. REv. 357, 376-79 (1974). See generally Pielemeier, supra note 146, at
415-35 (discussing due process limitations and competing considerations).
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, class actions pursuant to Rule
23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and in some cases 23(b)(3) bind absentees who do not receive adequate notice, if they have adequate representation. See Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1979); Society for Individual Rights v.
Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906 (9th Cir. 1975); Ryan v. Shea, 525 F.2d 268, 275
(10th Cir. 1975); Keene v. United States, 81 F.R.D. 653, 657-59 (S.D. W. Va.
1979); FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 41(2) & comment f (1982); 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MLnLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1786, at 142-43 (1972) (discussing notice requirements for
class actions under FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (c)); Hutchinson, supra note 116, at 499500, 504-06 (discussing representational aspects of class actions).
At least one court has held that a nonparty may be bound by a suit originally filed as a class action, but never formally certified, if the named "class
members" and the nonparty had substantially identical interests. See Jackson
v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121, 1124-26 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 952
(1980).
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primarily on whether a prior finding is reliable.2 85 In contrast,
reliability has never been sufficient to justify the use of collateral estoppel. Because of its severity, collateral estoppel has
had to be more sensitive to the limits of adjudication, particularly the fact that litigation, although reliable, cannot infallibly
determine historical truth. It is an inevitable fact that courts
can never do better than their best approximation of what actually happened, because they are handicapped by imperfect
knowledge and often by an inability to consider the controversy
2 86
as a whole.
Since our confidence in the accuracy of prior adjudications
is limited, other factors are necessary to justify the binding effect of collateral estoppel. The most important of these is participation by the party to be bound. If a party has had its "day
in court," it is easier to accept the possibility that the party is
being bound by a finding that may be wrong, because at least
that party has been heard. Because participation is the key to
collateral estoppel, "adequate representation" by a similarly
motivated litigant in a prior proceeding is not enough, at least
not by itself, to justify binding a nonparty.
Nonparty preclusion changes the balance completely, in effect basing collateral estoppel on reliability alone. According to
its proponents, "adequate representation" by a similarly motivated litigant in a prior proceeding is enough to bind a nonparty, because it is sufficient to insure that, as a general matter,
the finding is reliable.28 7 Participation in the prior proceeding,
a "day in court," is no longer required.
There are a number of significant assumptions underlying
nonparty preclusion. The first is that findings may be ab288
stracted out of the context in which they were first decided.
As one commentator noted, the demise of mutuality reflects a
view "that most lawsuits are essentially fungible for purposes
of preclusion, and therefore, no reason exists to retry issues
that have already been resolved in any one action. '28 9 Non285.
286.
(1982);
287.
288.

See supra notes 109-150 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS introduction, at 10-11
Hazard, supra note 118, at 83-85.
See supra notes 260-272 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS introduction, at 8 (1982).

289. Schroeder, supra note 146, at 948-49; see also Flanagan, supra note 239,
at 835. Professor James Flanagan stated:
[Miutuality is a way of looking at the scope of litigation and says nothing more than in a dispute between two parties only those directly involved are affected by the decision. We no longer have this restricted
concept of litigation and now accept the idea that litigation may re-
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party preclusion takes this abstraction of issues one step further by allowing the collateral estoppel of a nonparty to the
original suit. It reflects a view that litigation decides issues as
"free-floating, independent entities." 290 A second, related assumption is that individual control and participation in litigation have limited value. In effect, two similarly situated
litigants belong to a "class" for purposes of a particular issue.
As in a formally certified class action, an adequately represented nonparty can be bound by the judgment in the earlier
suit.291 These first two assumptions lead to a third: that the
purpose of litigation is to ascertain the "truth" about the unknown. 292 Under this view, by deciding an issue, the legal system disposes of it. Accepting those results as true eliminates
multiple, vexatious lawsuits and inconsistent outcomes, and
strengthens public confidence in the courts.
The wisdom of nonparty preclusion depends on the soundness of these interwoven assumptions about the nature and limits of adjudication. It is probable that, in these respects,
nonparty preclusion is based on a flawed vision of the judicial
process. 293 And, by basing collateral estoppel on reliability
solve questions of interest to and affecting more than just the named
parties.

I&.
290. George, supra note 194, at 657.
291. Society's interest in judicial efficiency, a goal often cited in support of
class actions, is mentioned frequently to justify nonparty preclusion. See Vestal, supra note 284, at 378-79. Other commentators have also likened nonparty
preclusion to class actions because both reflect an issue-oriented view of litigation. See Berch, supra note 8, at 535-36; George, supra note 194, at 656-57;
Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, supra note 146, at 1497; Comment,
Privity Rule, supra note 246, at 1103-05.
292. Cf.Callen & Kadue, To Bury Mutuality, Not to PraiseIt An Analysis
of CollateralEstotppel After Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore 31 HASTINGS L.J.
755, 812 (1980) ("A prior adjudication is sufficient for the application of collateral estoppel if it is not manifestly unsound.").
293. One recent United States Supreme Court decision, United States v.
Mendoza, 104 S. Ct. 568 (1984), illustrates healthy skepticism toward the assumptions behind nonparty preclusion. Mendoza involved a petition for naturalization under a special procedure established at the end of World War II for
Filipino veterans of the United States Army. Although the procedure had
lapsed 32 years earlier, the petitioner argued that naturalizations had been administratively blocked in violation of due process for much of the time he
could have filed. Id. at 570. Without reaching the merits of that argument, the
district court allowed Mendoza to use offensive collateral estoppel against the
federal government, which had already lost on the issue against other petitioners. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, holding that a private party may not use nonmutual offensive
collateral estoppel against the federal government. Id. at 574. The Court concluded that to allow offensive collateral estoppel against the government
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alone, nonparty preclusion also upsets a sound division of labor
by expecting collateral estoppel to do what evidence historically
has done, which is to give effect to a prior proceeding when collateral estoppel is barred by policies other than reliability. The
erosion of some of these policies has meant that evidentiary use
of judgments is required less often than it once was. 294 Unfortunately, it also has tempted courts and commentators to rely
uncritically on collateral estoppel alone to achieve the basic
goal of deference to prior adjudication that both collateral estoppel and evidence share.
The proponents of nonparty preclusion ask the courts to
turn too readily to collateral estoppel and to disregard the one
policy concern that, quite properly, still limits it. That policy
dictates that the fairness of collateral estoppel depends heavily
on the bound party's participation in the prior proceeding. The
critics of nonparty preclusion also have presented the issue in
needlessly stark terms. Their rejection of collateral estoppel
means that subsequent litigation totally ignores reliable prior
findings. The multiple claimant anomaly is one result. In
short, both sides to the nonparty preclusion debate have viewed
295
the issue too narrowly.
An intermediate position, admitting reliable prior findings
into evidence against nonparties, is the best response to the
nonparty problem. It would parallel the courts' past response
in similar situations, when they admitted judgments into evidence because of other barriers to collateral estoppel. Now, as
then, it would honor differences in purpose between evidence
and collateral estoppel. It would defer to reliable prior findings
so as to minimize multiple lawsuits and inconsistent adjudication. At the same time, by providing nonparties an opportunity
to be heard, it would recognize limits on accepting findings as
"true" out of context, thus avoiding the due process and policy
problems associated with collateral estoppel.
"would substantially thwart the development of important questions of law by
freezing the first final decision rendered on a particular legal issue." I&i at
572. Mendoza thus shows that when relitigation would serve an important
purpose, courts are quick to recognize that judicial findings are not synonymous with absolute truth and to forego the system's stake in regarding the
first determination as correct and binding.
294. See supra notes 11-108 and accompanying text.
295. Other proposed solutions include the transfer and consolidation of related suits, see Schroeder, supra note 146, at 963-80, and the expanded use of
Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Flanagan, supra note 118,
at 72-76.
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V. PRACTICAL CONCERNS WITH USE OF JUDGMENTS
AS EVIDENCE
The use of judgments as evidence is much more widespread
and logical than many people realize. Examining the relationship between evidence and collateral estoppel reveals that a
sound general rationale for admitting prior judgments into evidence is the fact that they can be used against nonparties. Admitting prior findings into evidence against nonparties is a far
better method of giving effect to prior judgments than the present trend toward nonparty preclusion. Practical considerations
must be addressed, however, among them whether juries are
institutionally capable of fairly evaluating prior judgments, and
whether meaningful standards can be provided to assist them
in that task. Any problem with evaluation of prior findings is
much less severe when the later litigation involves a bench
trial.
A. JURY COMPETENCE
The more fundamental issue is the jury's ability to weigh a
prior finding as evidence without undue prejudice. Some say
that a jury has no way to evaluate the prior finding, especially
where the later litigation includes rebuttal evidence.29 6 The
criticism is that the prior finding has both too much and too little influence on the jury. A prior finding has too much influence if it is given so much weight that the jury does not reach
an independent conclusion. If the jury does act independently,
however, the prior finding may have too little influence because the jury's consideration of the prior finding may be
unguided.
One early proponent of this view is Judge E. W. Hinton,
writing in 1932. He acknowledged that if the prior finding is
not rebutted, "we might indulge in a presumption and so settle
the matter. '297 He objected, however, in the more likely situation in which the other party comes forward with rebuttal
evidence:
[I]f
there is other evidence on the questions what effect should be
given to the fact that another jury on an unknown state of the evidence arrived at a given conclusion? The present jury, if it really considers the matter, must either blindly accept the conclusion of the
first jury or ignore it because there is no rational alternative 29 8
296. See infra notes 297-298 and accompanying text.
297. Hinton, supra note 29, at 198.
298. Id. The author did not elaborate on his reasoning. In the same pas-
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In contrast, most modern commentators would not categorically declare juries incompetent to weigh prior determinations.
Dean John Wigmore, for example, argued that our system is
based on a trust in juries that makes evidentiary use of judgments appropriate. 2 99 More recently, Professors David Louisell
and Christopher Mueller have noted that "the procedural safeguards available in the prior proceedings go far to reduce the
significance of the objection" that the jury has no means to
evaluate the prior finding.3 0 0 The drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence noted that Rule 803(22) provides the jury with no
guidance for weighing criminal convictions, but calmly observed that "it seems safe to assume that the jury will give [the
criminal conviction] substantial effect unless defendant offers a
satisfactory explanation, a possibility not foreclosed by the

provision."30 1
One argument in favor of a jury's competence to evaluate
prior judicial findings is that they are like expert testimony.3 0 2
Several courts have so characterized administrative findings admitted into evidence.30 3 Of course, the prior finding would not
be subject to cross-examination, as expert testimony normally
is, but the same objection does not keep courts from admitting
administrative findings under Rule 803(8)(C) or former testimony by an expert under Rule 804(b)(1). Prior judicial findings probably are more reliable and need cross-examination less
sage, however, he confides that "[p]rivately we may doubt the capacity of the
jury to evaluate ordinary evidence," i&, thus revealing that his views actually
may be attributable to his general skepticism of juries. See also 4 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supranote 4, V 803(22)[01], at 803-352.
299. "For can we in the same breath say that the jury is to be trusted to
determine the fate of the parties in the present case, but that juries generally
are not to be trusted and that their verdicts are worthless?" 5 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 5, § 1671a, at 808.
300. 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 470, at 912-13; see also 4
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, %803(22)[01], at 803-352 (noting that
the Federal Rules of Evidence advisory committee felt that the judicial factfinding process produces reliable results).
301. FED. R. EviD. 803(22) advisory committee note.
302. See Palmer, sup'ra note 8, at 154.
303. See Melville v. American Home Assurance Co., 584 F.2d 1306, 1316 (3d
Cir. 1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125,
1148 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348
(1986); Sage v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1205, 1207 (D.N.H. 1979); see
also FED. R. EviD. 702 (allowing objections to expert witnesses' qualifications);
FED. R. EvID. 705 (allowing disclosure of basis of expert's opinion on cross-examination); Note, Trustworthiness,supra note 15, at 492-93.
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than these other types of admissible hearsay. 3° 4
The analogy to expert testimony raises another, more serious, problem: a jury may regard a prior finding as so reliable
that it will not conscientiously consider rebuttal evidence. For
example, in Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,3 0 5 the Third
Circuit held that the trial court had erred in admitting the verdict of a similar case against the same defendant. 30 6 The court
noted that "[a] jury is likely to give a prior verdict against the
same defendant more weight than it warrants. The admission
of a prior verdict creates the possibility that the jury will defer
to the earlier result and thus will, effectively, decide a case on
3 0°7
evidence not before it."
It is improbable that juries will be so blindly deferential.
Jury instructions can make it clear that prior findings are mere
evidence and not binding. Proper jury instructions allow the
jury to consider the prior finding but impress it with the need
to reach its own decision. The potential difficulties with this
practice are no greater than those with instructions on corroboration or presumptions, which can be very complex.308 Furthermore, courts customarily admit evidence with instructions
to consider defects not serious enough to bar admission but affecting the weight that the evidence deserves. 30 9 A few courts
304. See 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 1346, at 794. Wigmore asks: "Is not
the finding of a judge, or the verdict of a jury, based on at least as thorough an
inquiry as those other reports and certificates? Has it not some value as evidence, even though not conclusive?" Id; see also id.§ 1671a, at 806; Palmer,
supra note 8, at 158.
305. 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975).
306. Id-at 1350-51; see Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F.
Supp. 453 (W.D. Pa. 1968), qffd,417 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969).
307. Coleman, 525 F.2d at 1351; see also City of New York v. Pullman Inc.,
662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981) (excluding prior administrative findings on unfair practice grounds), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at
1186 (judicial findings "would likely be given undue weight by the jury, thus
creating a serious danger of unfair prejudice"); Fowler v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 92 F.R.D. 1, 2 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (excluding administrative findings). Unfair prejudice arguments have also been made with respect to reports
that may have a "false aura of scientific infallibility." In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). This danger is present with all expert testimony. See, e.g., Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550
F.2d 505, 511-12 (2d Cir.) (holding that reversible error occurred when plaintiff's securities expert stated to the jury, conclusively, the proper resolution of
the issue), cert denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
308. See Scott v. Robertson, 583 P.2d 188, 193 (Alaska 1978); Palmer, supra
note 8, at 156-57.
309. See In re Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 421 n.16 (6th Cir. 1982);
Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1979); Baker v. Elcona
Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558-59 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933
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have commented that a finding admitted into evidence can be
conclusive in practical effect.31 0 These cases, however, seem to
say only that a finding admitted into evidence can be practically
conclusive absent rebuttal evidence, and not that rebuttal evidence, when offered, is always ineffective.31 1 Thus, the chance
to rebut a prior judgment is a meaningful one, and concerns
that judges and juries may be unwilling to consider rebuttal evidence appear unjustified.
The history of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act supports this
view. 312 The United States Supreme Court has said that section

5(a) has limited practical value because prima facie evidence
falls far short of collateral estoppel.3 1 3 Similarly, the 1980
amendment to section 5(a) was based on the view that giving
prior government findings evidentiary effect left too much opportunity for meaningful rebuttal. 314
In another context, one court observed that admitting administrative findings into evidence does not usurp the function
of the jury under the seventh amendment because it "interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the issues, and
takes no question of fact from either court or jury. '31 5 Indeed,
confidence that juries will not defer blindly to a prior finding is
the basis for admitting it as evidence and thereby disregarding
the other policies that often bar collateral estoppel.316
Another serious concern is that admitting judgments into
(1979); United States v. School Dist. of Ferndale, Mich., 577 F.2d 1339, 1355
(6th Cir. 1978); Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 655 (D. Nev. 1982);
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 365 (D.D.C. 1980).
310. See Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Ferrara, 277 F.2d 388, 392 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 903 (1960); Warren v. Applebaum, 526 F. Supp. 586, 588
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); Ruth v. First Nat'l Bank, 410 F. Supp. 1233, 1234 (D.N.J.
1976).
311. See supra note 310; see also Medical Arts Bldg., Ltd. v. Eralp, 290
N.W.2d 241, 246 (N.D. 1980) (finding "little or no difference between a judgment which is prima facie evidence and has not been overcome by counter evidence and a judgment which is conclusive").
312. See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
313. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co.,
381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965); Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 542-44 (1954); see also Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 453 F.2d
288, 291 (9th Cir. 1971) (concluding that § 5 merely raises a rebuttable presumption) (quoting Meeker & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 236 U.S. 412, 430
(1915)), cert denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1972).
314. See H.R. REP. No. 874, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2752, 2754-55.
315. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1180 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 266 U.S. 412, 430 (1915)).
316. See supra notes 109-150 and accompanying text.
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evidence necessarily subjects prior proceedings to later challenge. Admitting the prior judgment and allowing an opportunity for rebuttal may lead to a rerun of the first proceeding in
the second proceeding, in addition to what the second proceeding itself requires. Furthermore, a rule of evidence that seems
to encourage attack on the workings of other courts may be bad
policy.
It is doubtful that these are real problems in a significant
number of cases. For tactical reasons, litigants will probably
find it unnecessary and undesirable to argue that a tribunal's
judgments are inherently and categorically suspect or unreliable. In most cases, litigants will find the better tactic is to rebut
prior judicial findings much more narrowly, by pointing out, for
example, that the earlier proceeding failed to consider probative evidence. Moreover, nothing suggests that admission into
evidence would subject judgments to more scrutiny than they
must endure today when they are offered as collateral estoppel
and courts go outside the prior record, which they do routinely. 317 Our decision making institutions are not so fragile
that they cannot withstand review. The opportunity to appeal a
judgment is premised on that fact.
Of course, if prior judgments are unusually confusing or
prejudicial, or if litigants insist on a lengthy reexamination of

the first proceeding, some especially difficult situations arise.
This does not justify generally rejecting the use of judgments,
however. Such problems are frequent in evidence doctrine, especially when dealing with hearsay, and there are several ways
of addressing them.
First, courts can always consider the effectiveness of a limiting jury instruction.3 18 Second, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules
317. Even if the record seems clear on its face, extrinsic evidence is permitted to show which issues actually were litigated and determined in the prior
action. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment f (1982); see

Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1876); Lloyd v. American Export Lines,
580 F.2d 1179, 1187-90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978); Seaboard Air
Line R.R. v. George F. McCourt Trucking, Inc., 277 F.2d 593, 597 (5th Cir.
1960); 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 470, at 896-901; 18 C.
WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER, sulpra note 1, § 4420, at 189-92. If what the
first case decided remains unclear, it has no effect. Russel4 94 U.S. at 609-10;
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1965); cf. Columbia Plaza Corp. v.
Security Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 780, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (prior general verdict,
admitted under Rule 803(22), proves nothing in subsequent case as to guilt on
specific counts).
318. See FED. R. EviD. 403 advisory committee note; accord FED. R. EVID.
105 (providing that "[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party or for
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is
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of Evidence allows the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. ' 319 Courts frequently use
Rule 403 to exclude otherwise admissible prior findings, where,
for example, the prior finding might be prejudicial or confusing.320 If introducing the judgment is likely to lead to an indisadmitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly"); see also Litton Sys. v. American Tel.
& Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1983) (prior Federal Communications
Commission decisions admitted with limiting instructions to jury), cert denied,
464 U.S. 1073 (1984); Note, Trustworthiness,supra note 15, at 507-08 & n.83
(discussing effectiveness of limiting instructions); cf. Givens v. Lederle, 556
F.2d 1341, 1346 (5th Cir. 1977) (admitting government documents with limiting
instructions to jury); In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany, 586 F.
Supp. 711, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (risk of confusion minimized by limiting documents allowed in jury room), rev'd on other grounds, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 85 (1986).
319. FED. R. EVID. 403; see also Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc.,
682 F.2d 1149, 1185 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
460 U.S. 1007 (1983); 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supranote 15, § 470, at 91213; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, 803(22)[01], at 803-351; Note,
Trustworthiness,supra note 15, at 497 n.27. See generally 1 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 15, §§ 124-130 (1977) (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 403).
320. See Diaz v. Cianci, 737 F.2d 138, 139 (1st Cir. 1984); Brumley Estate v.
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465
U.S. 1028 (1984); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1347 (5th Cir. 1978);
see also Lloyd v. American Export Lines, 580 F.2d 1179, 1189 (3d Cir.) (upholding the admission of evidence obtained through an investigation by foreign authorities but stating that, in circumstances in which the foreign government's
criminal proceedings are not comparable to America's procedures, the trial
court has the discretion to exclude the proffered evidence under Rule 403),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563
F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1977) (argument that admission of evidence of McShain's
parallel suit for recission violates Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is without
merit because only a mild potential for prejudice has been suggested by reference to the suit); Walker v. Fairchild Indus., 554 F. Supp. 650, 658 (D. Nev.
1982) (finding it within the court's discretion, under Federal Rule of Evidence
403, to exclude evidence which would confuse the jury); City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1257, 1260-61 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
affd, 734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 253 (1984); cf. Brownko
Int'l, Inc. v. Ogden Steel Co., 585 F. Supp. 1432, 1434-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (arbitrator's award not admitted because it was so ambiguous that it might confuse
the factfinder).
Here, it is useful to reconsider Coleman and the other cases that excluded
prior findings as prejudicial because of the government imprimatur. See supra
notes 305-307 and accompanying text. These decisions applied Rule 403 on a
case-by-case basis, without suggesting that prior findings are always inadmissible. After considering additional sources of possible prejudice, they concluded
that the prejudice outweighed the limited probative value of the finding in
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criminate reexamination of the prior proceeding, Rule 403
allows a court to conclude that the judgment's probative value
is not worth the time.321 Rule 403 also applies when, wholly
apart from considerations of prejudice, confusion, or time, little
can be gained by admitting the prior finding into evidence.
Rule 102, which sets out the goal of "elimination of unjustififor refusable expense and delay," provides further authority
32 2
ing to admit judgments in these types of cases.
In addition to these general provisions, some specific rules
that admit findings into evidence are self-limiting if prejudice,
confusion, or inefficiency outweigh probative value. For example, Rule 803(8)(C), which admits administrative findings, requires "trustworthiness."s3s In fact, litigants opposing the
admission of an administrative finding typically make a threequestion. In Coleman, for example, the court reached this conclusion largely
because the prior verdict was offered only to show witness bias. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1350-51 (3d Cir. 1975). By authorizing
an ad hoc exclusion, these cases actually support admission into evidence as a
general rule. See also City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d
Cir. 1981) (affirming as "eminently sound," the trial court's exclusion from evidence of a government report which, because incomplete and based on hearsay would have falsely given it "an aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness" it did not merit); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1149 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (arguing that even though evidence is highly probative it can be excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence
403 in the court's discretion), affd in part and rev'd in part sub norn. In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust LAtig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106
S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
321. See Bright v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 19, 23 (6th Cir.
1984) ("extremely difficult and time-consuming to evaluate the report's trustworthiness by examining all the data on which it was based"); Brumley Estate
v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983) (prior jury
findings were "not highly probative" and later litigation would involve "substantially the same evidence"), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1028 (1984); City of New
York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1981) ("likely to protract an
already prolonged trial with an inquiry into collateral issues regarding the accuracy of the report and the methods used in its compilation"); see also John
McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1977); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
cf. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081,
1171-72 (7th Cir.) ("litigants are not entitled to burden the court with an unending stream of cumulative evidence"; not error to limit each side's time for
its case-in-chief), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
322. Rule 102 provides: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness
in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED. R. EviD.
102.
323. See supra notes 12-28 and accompanying text.
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pronged argument: that the finding is not "factual," that it is
not "trustworthy," and that in any event it is unduly prejudicial
3
under Rule 403.

4

Of course, none of these ways to control use of judgments
as evidence can make jury deliberations rational or verdicts
predictable. The jury system simply does not work that way.
To the extent that the admission of a prior judgment introduces
additional uncertainty, litigants can deal with it through the
only way to conform outcomes to perceived probabilities of winning or losing-through negotiation and settlement.3 2, Finally,
courts should not be so concerned with excluding some problematic findings that they overlook the many that are particularly useful in later litigation. For example, when the passage
of time has made an accurate inquiry difficult, considering a
prior finding adds both efficiency and accuracy.
Of course, whether one believes a jury can fairly evaluate a
prior judgment when it is admitted into evidence depends
largely on one's feelings about juries. The commentators who
have addressed these questions have tended to reason inductively from their own untestable assumptions about the behavior and competence of judges and juries. 326 These assumptions
probably play too great a role for any answer, even one based
on empirical research, to be fully persuasive to all observers. 327
Taken together, however, these considerations bearing on the
324. See Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 299-305 (4th Cir.
1984); Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 580 F. Supp. 890, 898-902 (N.D. Iowa
1982), affd, 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1155-61 (E.D. Pa. 1980), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust IAtig., 723 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other groundssub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); Note, Trustworthiness, supra
note 15, at 498 n.34.
325. See Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage
Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158, 172-73 (1958).

326. See supra notes 297-302 and accompanying text.
327. A survey of the literature did not reveal any recent empirical studies
directly relevant to these issues. Several, however, deal with similar topics.
See Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 601 (1975); Hosch, A Comparisonof Three Studies of the Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors, 4 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 1297 (1980); Teitelbaum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the PrejudicialEffect of Evidence: Can
Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV.
1147; Wissler & Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use PriorConviction Evidence to Decide on Guil 9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 37
(1985); Comment, Helping the Jury EvaluateEyewitness Testimony: The Need
for Additional Safeguards,12 AM. J. CRIM. L. 189 (1984).
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competence of juries justify admitting judgments into evidence
in certain situations.

B. STANDARDS FOR JURIES
One potential problem with admitting judgments into evidence is providing meaningful standards by which juries can assess the weight that should be given the prior judgment. This,
however, is probably more of a problem in theory than in practice. Courts have ample experience in presenting prior findings
to a jury with instructions that they are merely evidence that
may be rebutted. 328 Courts can draw on their experience in
cases in which administrative findings, criminal convictions, antitrust convictions, state employment discrimination findings,
or judgments of patent validity have been admitted into
evidence.
An important source of guidance is the United States
Supreme Court opinion in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.329 The Court's opinion sets forth basic guidelines to
328. See infra notes 341-342 and accompanying text.
329. 340 U.S. 558 (1951). Plaintiffs, a former Chevrolet dealer and its related finance company, sought treble damages for an alleged violation of § I of
the Sherman Act. They claimed that defendants General Motors and its
wholly-owned subsidiary, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC),
had conspired to force dealers to arrange new and used car purchases through
GMAC. Id at 562-63.
Earlier, General Motors and GMAC had been indicted and convicted on
criminal conspiracy charges for the same activities. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941). Relying
on § 5(a) of the Clayton Act, the plaintiffs sought to introduce into evidence
the six-volume record of testimony and exhibits in the criminal case. Emich,
340 U.S. at 564. The trial judge refused to admit the entire record, but he did
admit the prior criminal indictment, verdict, and judgment. Id. He allowed
the plaintiffs to rely on the conviction to show that the defendants had conspired unlawfully to compel the use of GMAC financing and to cancel dealerships to coerce compliance. Id. at 565. The jury found for the plaintiffs. Id.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld admission of only the conviction itself, and only as prima facie evidence of the conspiracy. Id at 566. In its view,
the trial court had erred in admitting the indictment and in instructing that
the jury could use it to "'ascertain the means and acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy,"' including the conspiracy's resort to cancellation of
dealerships to force compliance. Id. at 565-67 (quoting and discussing Emich
Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 181 F.2d 70, 75-76 (7th Cir. 1950), rev'd
340 U.S. 558 (1951)).
On review, the Supreme Court concentrated on the language of § 5(a),
which provides that the prior judgment is "prima facie evidence of 'all matters
respecting which' the judgment 'would be an estoppel' between the defendants
and the United States." Id at 568 (quoting Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 5, 38 Stat.
730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982))). The Court said
that "plaintiffs are entitled to introduce the prior judgment to establish prima
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assist trial judges in dealing with the two problems that the
Court associated with the use of judgments as evidence. First,
the trial judge should examine the entire record to ascertain
what the prior findings were.3 30 This is particularly important
in the typical case, where the judgment is based on a general
331
verdict.
Second, the trial judge must present the prior findings to
the jury. "It is the task of the trial judge to make clear to the
jury the issues that were determined against the defendant in
the prior suit, and to limit to those issues the effect of that
judgment as evidence in the present action." 332 He "must be
free to exercise 'a well-established range of judicial discretion"'
to educate and inform the jury about the prior litigation.ass
The Court explained that the trial judge "is not precluded
from resorting to such portions of the record, including the
pleadings and judgment, in the antecedent case as he may find
necessary or appropriate to use in presenting to the jury a clear
picture of the issues decided there and relevant to the case on
trial." 334 When necessary, the judge should omit prejudicial aspects of the prior finding.3 35 The judge may give these instructions either when the prior judgment is offered into evidence,
336
or at any later appropriate time.

facie all matters of fact and law necessarily decided by the conviction and the
verdict on which it was based." Id. at 569. Finally, the Court agreed with the
trial court that the conviction was admissible to prove the specific coercive
practices as well as the conspiracy. Id at 570-71.
330. Emich, 340 U.S. at 569 ("Under these circumstances what was decided
by the judgment must be determined by the trial judge hearing the treble
damage suit, upon an examination of the record, including the pleadings, the
evidence submitted, the instructions under which the jury arrived at its verdict, and any opinions of the courts.") (citations omitted).
331. Emich, 340 U.S. at 569. A bench trial in the prior government action
makes matters much simpler. See Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp.
35, 67 (D. Minn. 1966), affd sub nom Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768
(8th Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967).
332. Emich, 340 U.S. at 571.
333. Id,
334. Id. at 571-72; see also Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside
Theatre Corp., 194 F.2d 846, 853-54 (8th Cir.) (allowing admission of excerpt
from jury instructions given at previous trial), cert denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952).
335. See S. SALTZBTRG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EViDENCE MANUAL 583-85 (3d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1985).
336. Emich, 340 U.S. at 572. Several years after Emich, the Supreme Court
provided more specific guidance by approving the following instruction, in
which the trial judge had explained the force of a prior judgment on related
facts:

[T]hese same defendants had, at a time previous to the opening of the
Crest Theatre, conspired together in restraint of trade in violation of
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Emich thus established guidelines when before there had

been few.337 Along with other later Clayton Act cases,3 38 it has

guided the use of judgments as evidence in other situations,
even those that do not use the express "prima facie evidence"
formula found in the Clayton Act. For example, Rule 803(22)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence does not say what weight
prior criminal convictions should receive, but courts admitting
them into evidence have followed Emich either explicitly or

implicitly.339 Emich is particularly applicable to criminal conthese same Anti-Trust laws, in restricting to themselves first run and
in establishing certain clearances in numerous places throughout the
United States. Thus, these proven facts, I instruct you, become prima
facie evidence in the present case, which the plaintiff may use in support of its claim that what the defendants have done since those decrees, in the present case in Baltimore, is within the prohibition of
those earlier decrees. However, this is only prima facie evidence.
There was not before the Court in the prior case the present factual
situation which is before you now with respect to Baltimore theatres.
Therefore, it is still necessary in the present case, in order for the
plaintiff to recover, for it to prove to your satisfaction, by the weight
of the credible evidence, that these defendants, or some of them, have
conspired in an unreasonable manner to keep first run exhibitions
from the plaintiff, or have conspired to restrict plaintiff to clearances
which are unreasonable.
Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1954).
337. For additional commentary on Emich, see Timberlake, The Use of
Government Judgments or Decrees in Subsequent Treble Damage Actions
Under the Antitrust Laws, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV 991, 996-1008 (1961). For a discussion of some of these techniques in the Rule 803(8)(C) context, see Note,
Trustworthiness,supra note 15, at 507-09. Before Emich, "the practice seems
to have been to admit rather haphazardly all or portions of the complaint of
indictment, the decree or judgment, and perhaps parts of the record which indicated relevant issues determined in the Government litigation." Note, Government Antitrust Judgments as Evidence in PrivateActions, supra note 58,
at 1404 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 295 F. 98,
100 (5th Cir. 1923), affd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 359 (1927)).
338. See Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979); Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709,
724-28 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960); Eagle Lion Studios v.
Loew's Inc., 248 F.2d 438, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1957), affd by an equally divided
court4 358 U.S. 100 (1958); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 65 (D.
Minn. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1967); Harrison v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 115 F.
Supp. 312, 314-15 (E.D. Pa 1953), ajffd, 211 F.2d 405 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 348
U.S. 828 (1954). For a similar pre-Emich case, see Fifth & Walnut, Inc. v.
Loew's, Inc., 176 F.2d 587, 593-94 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 338 U.S. 894 (1949).
339. See Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l Bank, 676 F.2d 780, 789-90
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (following Emich explicitly); Lloyd v. American Export Lines,
580 F.2d 1179, 1187-90 (3d Cir.) (following Emich implicitly), cert denied, 439
U.S. 969 (1978); see also Semler v. Psychiatric Inst., 538 F.2d 121, 127 (4th Cir.)
("court was free to assign this evidence the weight that it saw fit"), cert denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); New York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co. v. Continental Ins.
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victions because both the Clayton Act and Rule 803(22) admit
into evidence only findings that were necessary to the prior
judgment.3 0
In other contexts, such as administrative findings, courts
have used an approach that is consistent with Emich, but have
not relied expressly on antitrust or criminal cases. For example, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Missouri gave the following instruction, which is typical in cautioning that the administrative finding is mere evidence, and in
suggesting why the jury might reach a different conclusion:
[The finding] is not binding on you. This lawsuit is an independent
inquiry. You are hearing testimony that was not or may not have
been presented to the government agency. In this lawsuit we are having a hearing in which attorneys for both sides can cross examine witnesses, which may help you in determining the truth in this case. The
government agency did not hold such a hearing, under its procedures,
and you may consider that in determining how much weight, if any, to
give the findings and actions of the [agency]. You may consider the
extent of the [agency] investigation, as recited in the report ... and
other testimony in this case, and you may give the report as much
weight,
if any, in your deliberations as you conclude should be given
341
to it.

In a different case, the Fifth Circuit upheld a less elaborate
instruction concerning administrative law judge findings
adopted by the Federal Trade Commission. The district court
instructed that the findings "may be received as evidence instead of, for example, having a witness testify to those matters
or instead of having a document introduced to show it. It is
simply evidence to be considered by you along with all the
other evidence in the case."=
Title VII cases are less instructive because none of the parCo., 117 F.2d 404, 411 (2d Cir.) ("the conviction should have been treated as
proof of... fault"), cert denied, 313 U.S. 580 (1941); 4 D. LOUisELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 470, at 898 n.13, 901 nn.15-16. For prior criminal cases as
collateral estoppel, see United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1978);
United States v. King, 563 F.2d 559, 561 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 918
(1978); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274-75 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 400
U.S. 846 (1970); United States v. Fabric Garment Co., 366 F.2d 530, 534 (2d Cir.
1966).
340. See Emich, 340 U.S. at 569-71; FED. R. EvM. 803(22).
341. Cohen v. General Motors Corp., 534 F. Supp. 509, 512 n.3 (W.D. Mo.
1982).
342. In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 1981), cert
dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983); see also United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 366 (D.D.C. 1980).
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ties have a right to a jury trial. 3 The relevant factors, however, are similar, and were set out by the Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,344 which concerned the use
of arbitral findings as evidence in later Title VII suits.3 5 Factors to consider in assessing the weight to be given the prior determination include the similarity between the substantive
principles in the two proceedings, the "degree of procedural
fairness," the "adequacy of the record," and the "special competence of particular arbitrators. ' 's 46 The prior finding may be entitled to "great weight" if it gave "full consideration" to the
Title VII claim, especially when the issue was "solely one of
fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record."' 7 At least one
lower court has used these guidelines for state findings in Title
VII cases,3 s and the EEOC has incorporated them into its
regulations.3 9
Some courts have gone one step further and tried to relate
the evidentiary weight of a prior judgment to burdens of production and persuasion. According to most courts, the prior
judgment is "prima facie evidence" in the sense that it satisfies
the plaintiff's burden of production on the issue.3 °0 The de343. Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 (1981); Great Am. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 (1979).
344. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
345. See supra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
346. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
347. Id.
348. See Kralowec v. Prince George's County, 503 F. Supp. 985, 993 n.11 (D.
Md. 1980), affid mem,, 679 F.2d 883 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 872 (1982).
349. The regulations provide:
"Substantial weight" shall mean that such full and careful consideration shall be accorded to final findings and orders, as defined
above, as is appropriate in light of the facts supporting them, when
they meet all of the prerequisites set forth below: (i) The proceedings
were fair and regular; and (ii) The practices prohibited by the State or
local law are comparable in scope to the practices prohibited Federal
law; and (iii) The final findings and order serve the interest of the effective enforcement of Title VII: Provided, That giving substantial
weight to final findings and orders of a 706 Agency does not include
according weight, for purposes of applying Federal law, to such
Agency's conclusions of law.
29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(e)(2) (1985).
350. See New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
332 F.2d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 1964), affld, 381 U.S. 311 (1965); Richfield Oil Corp. v.
Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 1959), cert denied, 361 U.S. 961
(1960); Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35, 65 (D. Minn. 1966), affd
sub nom. Hardy Salt Co. v. Illinois, 377 F.2d 786 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 912 (1962). Several decisions speak of a "rebuttable presumption," but
without offering a helpful definition of that term. See Southern Pac. Commu-
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fendant can still offer rebuttal evidence, and the plaintiff still
has the burden of persuasion. Commentators generally agree
with this approach. 351 The authorities do not discuss whether
the prior judgment is "prima facie evidence" in the sense that it
would require a verdict be directed for the plaintiff if the defendant offers no rebuttal evidence at all, perhaps because such
cases are rare or nonexistent. In any event, this ambiguity is
not a problem for the jury, but rather for the judge.
These previous observations address the situation in which
the party with both the burdens of production and persuasion
offers the judgment into evidence. In the patent validity cases,2
the party who offers the prior finding has neither burden.3
The prior finding of validity enhances the burden borne by the
party asserting invalidity, by requiring it to overcome the combined effect of the statutory presumption and the prior finding.3 53 This approach presumably would apply in other cases in
which the offering party does not have the burdens of production and persuasion.
Distilling a more specific rule for presenting prior findings
to juries, given the variety of situations in which the issue can
arise, is difficult at best and misleading at worst. The more
prudent course is to use prior experience to draw a few limited
conclusions about handling judgments as evidence. First, courts
have developed some guidelines that are very general but may
be tailored to fit each case. Second, many courts have applied
some form of these guidelines in many cases. Finally, there has
been no serious criticism of these standards, either generally or
for their apparent lack of precision.
Courts have vast experience with judgments as evidence.
If their guidelines seem imprecise, they are imprecise in ways
nications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 740 F.2d 1011, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
McCook v. Standard Oil Co., 393 F. Supp. 256, 260 (C.D. Cal. 1975). Another
court has said that prima facie evidence "results in shifting the burden of
proof to the defendants, but the statute does not preclude them from putting
up a defense." Illinois v. General Paving Co., 590 F.2d 680, 681 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979). It would be consistent with the other interpretations of "prima facie evidence" set forth above to assume that the term refers
to the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion.
351. See Comment, Government Judgments, supra note 31, at 339 n.6;
Note, Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage Suitors?, 61 YALE L.J. 417,
420 n.14, 425 (1952).
352. Because the patentee has established validity in a prior proceeding,
the burdens of production and persuasion shift to the alleged infringer who
must present convincing justification for departing from the prior finding of
validity. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
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that courts in the common-law tradition generally find acceptable and perhaps even desirable. Criticism of the practice has
been absent when its use has been heaviest, and this silence
speaks powerfully in its favor. As previously discussed, the
haphazard pattern of admissible judgments reflects the historical expansion of collateral estoppel, not the view that juries can
evaluate these findings better than others.-a Finally, the alternative is unattractive. Unless judgments are admitted into evidence against nonparties, the pressure for nonparty preclusion
threatens to distort collateral estoppel.
VI.

A PROPOSAL

The foregoing analysis suggests that the general rule of law
preventing the evidentiary use of prior judgments should be
modified. More specifically, a new rule should be adopted stating that, to the extent that a prior finding would be collateral
estoppel against a party, it should be admissible as evidence
against a nonparty. The most direct method of implementing
this modification would be to add an appropriately drafted
hearsay exception to the rules of evidence. Alternatively, prior
findings might also be admissible under existing residual exceptions, such as Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 355
Evidence offered under the residual exceptions must have
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equaling those
of the other hearsay exceptions. 356 It must be "offered as evidence of a material fact" and "more probative on the point for
354. See supra notes 11-108 and accompanying text.
355. Rule 803(24) provides a hearsay exception for
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may
not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it
makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial
or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.

FED. R. EviM. 803(24). Rule 804(b)(5) is an identically worded provision that
applies when the declarant is unavailable. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(5). Courts
generally analyze and apply the two provisions in roughly the same manner.
See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 472, at 922-23.
356. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
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which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts."3 5 7 Admission
must accord with "the general purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice." 358 Lastly, the proponent must provide no359
tice of its intent to offer the evidence.
At present, no reported cases have admitted a prior domestic judicial finding into evidence under either residual exception in the Federal Rules. 36 0 Moreover, no commentators
proposed reading the residual exceptions to allow admission of
prior judicial findings. Several cases, however, have used these
exceptions to admit material from earlier judicial proceedings,3 61 and Judge Jack B. Weinstein has observed that "rules
803(22) [judgment of previous conviction], 803(23) [judgment as
to personal, family, or general history, or boundaries], and
803(24) [residual exception] provide the possibility for development of a broader exception for judgments." 3 62 Nothing in the
language or history of the rules suggests that they cannot apply
to judicial findings.
The "material fact" and "interests of justice" requirements
merely restate general principles already established under
Rules 401 and 402, and under Rule 102, respectively.3 63 The notice requirement presents no obstacle, and the trustworthiness
of a judicial finding is likely to equal or surpass that of "industry standards" and "opinion polls," which courts regularly admit under the residual exception. 36
357. Id.

358. Id.
359. Id360. Cf.Branca v. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co., 773 F.2d 1158, 1160-61
(11th Cir. 1985) (Argentine court decree admissible into evidence under Rule
803(24)).
361. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1985); Estate of Gryder v. Commissioner, 705 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 464
U.S. 1008 (1983); United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 588-99 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 135260 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 516 F. Supp. 1237, 1239-42 (D.D.C. 1981). But cf.Arrow-Hart,
Inc. v. Covert Hills, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 346, 347-49 (E.D. Ky. 1976) (witness can
read prior testimony into evidence under Rule 803(5), but Rule 803(24) does
not permit introduction of prior transcript as a whole), afffd sub nom ArrowHart, Inc. v. Philip Carey Co., 552 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1977).
362. 4 J. WEiNsTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 4, q 802(23)[01], at 803-367.
363. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 472, at 934, 939; 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, suPra note 4, %803(24)[01].
364. See Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 155-57 (4th
Cir. 1978) (federal safety standards admissible); Doss v. Apache Powder Co.,
430 F.2d 1317, 1322 (5th Cir. 1970) ("safety manual properly admitted because
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The major technical barrier to admission is that the prior
finding must be "more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts. '365 Under a grudging reading, the
finding must be more probative than all other evidence already
received on the issue. This interpretation would exclude a reliable finding even if its proponent has been diligent and admitting it would help resolve a conflict in evidence. A better
interpretation of the residual exception would require only that
the proponent introduce all evidence within reasonable reach
that is "more probative"
than the prior finding before offering
366
the finding itself.

A more basic problem with admitting prior judgments
under the residual exception concerns its general purpose. On
the one hand, the residual exception reflects a recognition that
not all hearsay that should be admissible can be described in
specific exceptions. 36 7 On the other hand, it is equally clear
that the rule against hearsay remains a rule of exclusion with
enumerated exceptions, and Congress cautioned that the
residual exception be "used very rarely, and only in exceptional
circumstances.1 368 Its use to admit judgments into evidence depends on courts' willingness to read the exception broadly.
The substance of the proposal is the same whether prior
judgments are admitted under a new hearsay exception or
under existing Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). In either case, the
proposal for use of judgments as evidence is a limited one.
Judgments would be admissible into evidence only against a
nonparty not subject to collateral estoppel. They would be admissible only to the extent that they would be collateral estoppel against a party. The word "evidence" refers to the degree
used to show long-standing common knowledge in the industry"); Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 682-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (admitting
surveys). See generally Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751,
757-59 (3d Cir. 1978).
365. FED. R. Evm. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
366. See 4 D. LoUisELL & C. MUELLEa, supra note 15, § 472, at 935-38.
367. See Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 1985); Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388, 396-98 (5th Cir.
1961); S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7065-66.
368. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20, reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEws 7051, 7066; see also Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d
286, 291 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing Congressional intent that residual hearsay
exception be used sparingly and only when necessary); United States v. Barrett, 598 F. Supp. 469, 482 (D. Me. 1984) (same), qff'd, 766 F.2d 609 (1st Cir.),
cert, denied, 106 S.Ct. 258 (1985).
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of subsequent effect that courts have accorded to the groups of
admissible prior findings that this Article has discussed.369 The
finding itself gives rise to an inference, and this inference is
sufficient to satisfy the burden of production. If the opponent
comes forward with rebuttal evidence, the issue is for the trier
of fact. The admission of the prior finding does not shift the
burden of persuasion. As a mere inference, it does not create a
rebuttable presumption that would compel a directed verdict on
370
the issue absent rebuttal evidence.
There are reasons for the limiting features of this proposal.
Using judgments as evidence will be manageable if courts use
strict collateral estoppel rules to ascertain what an earlier case
decided. By hypothesis, this will be no more difficult for judgments as evidence than it is for collateral estoppel.3 7 1 A prior
finding would be admitted only as to matters actually and necessarily decided. 372 These rules will help screen out prejudicial,
unreliable, and useless prior findings. They also will allow
courts admitting judgments as evidence against nonparties to
rely on a well-established body of case law.
Another reason to limit the proposed rule is the inevitable
skepticism about a jury's ability to fairly and competently evaluate a prior judgment. Not everyone will be convinced of a
369. See supra notes 11-108 and accompanying text.
370. For discussion of the often confusing terminology, see Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56 & nn.7 & 8 (1981); 1 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 15, § 67, at 532-39 (1977); Shapiro, supra
note 144, at 49-50 & n.108. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 301 governs "presumptions" and provides that a "presumption imposes on the party
against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence to meet
or rebut the presumption, . . . but does not shift the risk of nonpersuasion."
FED. R. EviD. 301. Shifting the burden of persuasion, however, against a nonparty raises serious due process concerns. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 551-52 (1965).
371. In fact, several of the categories of admissible judgments rely on collateral estoppel rules. Rule 803(22) admits a prior conviction "to prove any
fact essential to sustain the judgment." FED. R. EVID. 803(22); see supra notes
29-44 and accompanying text. The infrequently used hearsay exception for
personal, family, or general history, or boundaries, similarly refers to matters
"essential to the judgment." FED. R. EVID. 803(23). Similarly, § 5(a) of the
Clayton Act admits antitrust judgments "as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto."
Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982); see supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text. "The evidentiary use which may be made under § 5 of the prior
conviction of respondents is thus to be determined by reference to the general
doctrine of estoppel." Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S.
558, 568 (1951).
372. Eagle Lion Studios v. Loew's, Inc., 248 F.2d 438, 444 (2d Cir. 1957),
affd by an equally divided Cour4 358 U.S. 100 (1958).
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jury's ability to do so. This proposal focuses on cases of greatest
need-litigation involving nonparties to the first case. For the
same reason, the evidentiary treatment proposed is merely at
the level of "inference."
These limitations are acceptable because they do not
thwart the basic purpose of the proposal, which is to insure
proper respect for the processes and decisions of courts and
similar tribunals. That respect suffers most when neither collateral estoppel nor the rules of evidence allow a reliable finding to affect later litigation involving new parties. Sound
collateral estoppel doctrine always will be an incomplete solution because its concerns go beyond the reliability of the prior
finding. Until courts and commentators recognize that collateral estoppel and evidence are both methods of giving effect to
the reliable results of prior decision making, each with its own
role, the law in both areas is likely to suffer.
CONCLUSION
No general rule permits the evidentiary use of prior judgments, and the conventional wisdom is that they are inadmissible hearsay. Conventional wisdom notwithstanding, courts
routinely admit several large categories of prior findings into
evidence. These findings were originally admitted into evidence because they were, for various reasons, ineligible for collateral estoppel. Use as evidence was the only avenue that
would give them any effect in the subsequent proceeding. As
the doctrine of collateral estoppel expanded, however, these
types of findings came, quite by historical accident, to enjoy
preferential treatment: a range of subsequent effect from use
as evidence to full collateral estoppel effect. This state of affairs forces us to ask if judgments are still useful as evidence,
and if so, when they should be used as evidence instead of collateral estoppel.
Comparing collateral estoppel and use of judgments as evidence reveals a basic difference in approach. Evidence doctrine
in general is concerned primarily with reliability, and prior
findings were admitted into evidence because they were reliable. Collateral estoppel is also concerned with reliability, but
because of its severity, it encompasses other policies as well, the
most important of which is the party's opportunity to participate in the prior proceeding.
It is consistent with these similarities and differences between evidence and collateral estoppel that a prior judgment
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generally may not be employed to collaterally estop someone
who was not a party or a privy to the prior proceeding. It also
follows that prior judgments should be admissible into evidence
against a nonparty. Indeed, under present law, prior proceedings can affect nonparties through several avenues that
resemeble the use of prior findings as evidence. As yet, however, prior judgments are not generally admissible into
evidence.
Recently, the rule against collateral estoppel of nonparties
has shown signs of weakening, and prior findings have in some
cases been used to collaterally estop persons who were not parties or privies in the prior proceeding.
By allowing the collateral estoppel of nonparties to the
original suit, courts and commentators are forcing collateral estoppel to fulfill a function that has historically been filled by
admitting judgments into evidence: that of giving prior judgments subsequent effect when those judgments are reliable but
other policies, extrinsic to reliability, bar the use of collateral
estoppel. This is a most unfortunate development, because it
fails to recognize the inherent limits of adjudication and the
fact that participation in the prior proceeding is one of the most
significant justifications for collateral estoppel.
A much sounder method for enabling prior findings to affect nonparties is to admit them into evidence. Extensive experience with the categories of prior judgments that are already
admissible indicates that juries are institutionally capable of
fairly evaluating prior judgments, and that courts can provide
sufficient standards to assist them in that task. Through either
a new exception to the rule against hearsay, or through a liberal interpretation of the residual exception, a new rule should
be created stating that, to the extent a prior finding would be
collateral estoppel against a party, it should be admissible as evidence against a nonparty.

